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Fiscal Centralization, Limited
Government, and Public Revenues in  
Europe, 1650–1913 

MARK DINCECCO
Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist 
rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized 
institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to 
perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe 
from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes 
were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist 
ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning 
points in revenue series and political transformations.  
ost Old Regime polities faced two fiscal problems: fragmentation 
and absolutism. Jurisdictional divisions meant that sovereigns had 
incomplete power to raise taxes by themselves. Putting crowns in 
charge of tax rates was the only way to increase revenue streams. 
Though rulers had weak authority over revenues, they exercised great 
control over expenditures. Monarchs typically favored foreign military 
adventures over public services such as roads that would most benefit  
society. Limiting executive discretion was the only way to curb spend-
ing follies. Political conflicts were thus about who held control over the 
gathering and spending of public funds.1
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 This article examines the evolution of political structures and gov-
ernment revenues over the long run in an effort to improve our under-
standing of the effects of fragmentation and absolutism on public fin-
ances. The framework for analysis consists of two core elements. The 
first is from Douglass North and Barry Weingast.2 They claim that insti-
tutional changes with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 enabled the Eng-
lish Crown to make a credible commitment to responsible fiscal poli-
cies.3 In particular, parliament gained a regular constitutional right to 
monitor how the king spent tax revenues. The second part comes from 
S. R. Epstein.4 He argues that institutional fragmentation within polities, 
and not fiscal abuse by rulers, was the fundamental cause of public 
finance distortions prior to 1800.5
 The diverse sorts of polities and eras considered—North and Wein-
gast use England in the 1600s as evidence, while Epstein relies upon 
medieval Italy—limit the generality of such results, however.6 By 1913 
most European countries had struck an institutional balance that enabled 
central authorities to gather enough in tax revenues, while limiting ex-
ecutive discretion over expenditures. My goal here is to fuse the argu-
ments for centralization and parliamentary reforms into an integrated 
analysis of institutional change. A key feature is to adopt a systematic 
approach that examines the effects of structural reforms both within and 
across European polities. The investigation thus complements case 
study texts by Philip Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, Richard Bonney, 
Michael Bordo and Roberto Cortès-Conde, and others.7 The chosen  
and Acemoglu et al., “Colonial Origins,” “Reversal,” and “Rise.” However, Acemoglu, 
“Politics,” shows that central governments in rich countries tax heavily and play significant 
economic roles. Fragmentation also remains severe in poor parts of the world. See Migdal, 
Strong Societies; Wade, Governing the Market; Herbst, States; and Bates, Prosperity.
2 “Constitutions.” 
3 Also see Dickson, Financial Revolution, pp. 3–14; Jones, Revolution, pp. 3–17 and 311–31; 
Stone, Crisis, pp. 1–17; and Hill, Century, pp. 191–207 and 235–48. It is debatable whether po-
litical reforms associated with the Glorious Revolution actually improved property rights pro-
tections. Clark, “Political Foundations,” argues that secure property rights existed in England 
from 1600, while O’Brien, “Fiscal Exceptionalism,” claims that England implemented key con-
stitutional and administrative structures in the 1640s.  
4 Freedom.
5 Epstein claims that absolutism as a concept was devoid of much practical substance. See 
Freedom, p. 13. Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, p. 393, also downplay its importance. See 
Brewer, Sinews; Henshall, Myth; Hoffman and Rosenthal, “Political Economy of Warfare” and 
“Divided We Fall”; Rosenthal, “Political Economy of Absolutism”; and O’Brien, “Fiscal Ex-
ceptionalism” as well.
6 England, for instance, was exceptional since it was centralized from medieval times. See 
Brewer, Sinews, pp. 3–7; Sacks, “Paradox,” pp. 14–23; Epstein, Freedom, pp. 1–37; and 
O’Brien, “Fiscal Exceptionalism,” pp. 14–24. 
7 Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises; Bonney, Rise; and Bordo and Cortès-Conde, Trans-
ferring Wealth. Comparative studies of European fiscal history include Tilly, Coercion; Bonney, 
Economic Systems; and O’Brien, “Fiscal Exceptionalism.” Statistical analyses are rare; excep-
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period from 1650 to 1913 captures a clear pattern of political transfor-
mations as countries moved from fragmented and absolutist regimes to 
centralized and limited ones.  
 Though many scholars have examined the relationship between li-
mited government and public debt since North and Weingast’s article, 
the literature often overlooks the direct impact of political changes on 
public revenues.8 For instance, I find that centralized and limited re-
gimes in Europe were associated with significant reductions in sove-
reign credit risk from 1750 to 1913.9 Yet the precise mechanisms by 
which political reforms led to such gains remain unclear. This work 
considers one likely source: improvements in the government’s ability 
to raise tax revenues.
 I first construct a new panel data set on per capita revenues for eleven 
European countries. Long annual data series over a variety of political 
regimes characterize Group 1, which includes the largest or most impor-
tant players in Europe at the time: Austria-Hungary, England, France, 
the Netherlands, Prussia, and Spain. The second group (Belgium, Den-
mark, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden) has shorter data series. I then identi-
fy the timing of fiscal centralization and the rise of limited government 
within each polity. Centralization was typically the result of French 
conquest from 1789 to 1815. Limited government often took place  
decades after centralization during the 1800s.  
 The statistical framework that I use is innovative in that it consists of 
two components not often employed together: regressions on the panel 
data set and structural breaks tests. The regressions incorporate a rele-
vant set of control variables to test for the effects of political regimes on 
public finances. Though the transformations that I identify correspond 
with exogenously given historical events, they are “endogenous” in the 
sense that I have chosen the exact years to mark regimes as centralized 
or limited. For robustness, I employ structural breaks tests that assume 
no a priori knowledge of major turning points. The statistical inquiry 
supports the argument that political changes towards centralized and  
limited regimes led to significant increases in per capita revenues.  
tions are Stasavage, “Cities”; and Dincecco, “Political Regimes.” There is also a cross-country 
literature on the political economy of bond markets from 1870–1913. By then, however, many 
European countries were administratively centralized democracies. See, among others, Flan-
dreau and Zumer, Making; Bordo and Rockoff, “Gold Standard”; Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sove-
reign Risk”; and Ferguson and Schularick, “Empire Effect.” 
8 Researchers frequently use North and Weingast’s work as a point of departure. See, for in-
stance, Frey and Kucher, “History”; Sussman and Yafeh, “Country Risk” and “Financial Devel-
opment”; Quinn, “Glorious Revolution”; Stasavage, Public Debt and “Cities”; and Summerhill, 
Inglorious Revolution.
9 “Political Regimes.” 
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 The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section dates  
fiscal centralization and limited government while the following one 
describes the data and sample countries. After examining the French 
and Dutch cases in detail, I discuss the statistical framework and present 
the statistical results. The last section summarizes the main findings and 
their implications for future research.  
POLITICAL REGIMES IN EUROPE, 1650–1913 
From Divided Authority to Centralization 
 Most European polities were fiscally fragmented prior to the 1800s. 
In France, the Crown had to negotiate independently over tax amounts 
with entrenched local bodies. Tax pressure was thus uneven across 
place. Whole towns and provinces avoided certain duties. By the middle 
of the fifteenth century, nobles in central and northern France received 
exemptions from the Old Regime’s most valuable direct tax, the taille.
Farther south, nobles only paid the taille on certain holdings. A chief 
grievance on the eve of the French Revolution was the bewildering  
variety of taxes levied at disparate local rates.10
 In Spain, attempts to forge tax agreements among the five kingdoms 
united under the Crown were also unsuccessful. In the seventeenth  
century, Count-Duke Olivares failed to implement major structural 
changes, forcing the monarch to impose new taxes on top of old  
ones. At the start of the 1700s, Bourbon reformers tried in vain to ex-
tend the tax system in Castile to Spain’s eastern provinces. Incongruous 
names —the additional tax was called the catastro in Catalonia, the 
contribucìon ùnica in Aragon, and the equivalente in Valencia—
reflected the disparity in rates that remained afterwards.11
 In fragmented polities, there was a close relationship between local 
tax control and political autonomy. Thus, elites had strong incentives to 
oppose fiscal reforms that threatened traditional rights. The result was  
a classic public goods problem. Since each locality attempted to free 
ride on the tax contributions of others, per capita revenues collected  
10 Brewer, Sinews, pp. 5–7; Velde and Weir, “Financial Market,” pp. 6–8; Hoffman, “Early 
Modern France,” pp. 229–40; Major, Renaissance Monarchy, pp. 60–61; Sargent and Velde, 
“Macroeconomic Features,” pp. 482–85; Shapiro and Markoff, Revolutionary Demands, pp. 
377–409; and White, “France,” pp. 66–80. 
11 In the words of Tortella, Development, p. 174: “Attempts to modernize public finance go 
back to the eighteenth century, with the plan for a single tax. . . But a century later things were 
even worse. Until 1845 the Spanish taxation system was a disorganized and unsystematic mo-
saic. . .” Also see Elliot, Count-Duke, pp. 245–77; Lynch, Bourbon Spain, pp. 61–66; Tortella, 
Development, pp. 173–92; and Tortella and Comìn, “Merits,” pp. 141–48 and 150–60. 
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by sovereigns remained low. It is a familiar fact that eighteenth-century 
absolutist regimes in France and Spain levied lower taxes per head than 
parliamentary-style ones in England or the United Provinces.12
 With undivided fiscal authority, crowns no longer bargained over in-
dividual rates place by place but imposed a standard tax menu. Free rid-
ing was thereby eliminated. If crowns equalized taxes at relatively high 
levels, then per capita revenues rose. Hoffman and Jean-Laurent Rosen-
thal claim that both monarchs and locals may have preferred centralized 
regimes as part of power-sharing agreements whereby the former re-
ceived greater funds and the latter—who coordinated efforts through 
national representative bodies—were able to finance a larger portion  
of the public services that they valued.13 However, there was always the 
danger that executives would waste new revenues on items such as  
ill-advised wars, a possibility that I examine in the next section.  
 Though fiscal centralization in Europe was a centuries-long process, 
it remained largely unfinished through most of the 1700s. Profound 
changes often came with the French Revolution and Napoleon. In many 
places, therefore, centralization is identifiable as a structural shift that 
occurred from 1789 to 1815.
 A simple definition makes comparisons across polities possible. Fis-
cal centralization was completed the year that the national government 
began to secure revenues by way of a tax system with uniform rates 
throughout the country.14 This change typically occurred in the context 
of large-scale administrative reforms that established new state bureau-
cracies. Appendix 1 documents the details of fiscal centralization for 
each polity.
 In reality, levels of fragmentation varied across countries. To bias the 
evidence against my hypothesis, I have classified all pre-centralized re-
gimes as completely fragmented, even for polities where fragmentation 
was quite low. Thus, the statistical results will be even stronger than I 
claim if they still indicate that centralized regimes were associated with 
significantly higher revenues than fragmented ones.  
12 Mathias and O’Brien, “Taxation”; Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, pp. 299–310; 
Hoffman and Rosenthal, “Political Economy of Warfare,” p. 34; and White, “France,” pp. 62–
66.
13 “Divided We Fall.” 
14 This definition does not mean that national governments gained monopolies over taxation 
in turn. I use the United States to illustrate. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could 
only request tax funds from individual states. Fiscal centralization occurred in 1788, when the 
new Constitution granted Congress the power to ensure that states complied with national tax 
standards. After its promulgation, however, states maintained the ability to levy taxes. See Edl-
ing, Revolution.
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TABLE 1
FISCAL CENTRALIZATION IN EUROPE
Country Year Event 
Group 1 
England 1066 Norman conquest and subsequent erosion of provincial authority
France 1790 Administrative reforms after Revolution of 1789 
Netherlands 1806 Administrative reforms under French control  (1795–1813)
Prussia 1806 Administrative reforms after defeat in battle by French in 1806 
Spain 1844 Administrative reforms during “Moderate” decade of  1840s
Austria-Hungary 1848 Administrative reforms during Year of Revolutions 
Group 2 
Denmark 1688 Establishment of official cadastre system 
Belgium 1795 Administrative reforms after French annexation in  1795
Portugal 1832 Administrative reforms during Revolutionary era  (1820–1851)
Sweden 1840 “Departmental” reforms  
Italy 1861 Establishment of Kingdom in 1861 and subsequent  fiscal unification  
Notes: The first column lists the sample countries by group. Long annual data series over a va-
riety of political regimes characterize Group 1, which includes the largest and most important 
players in Europe at the time. Group 2 has shorter data runs. The second column displays the 
year that fiscal centralization as defined in the text was completed. The final column offers brief 
“explanations” for the dates, which are elaborated upon in Appendix 1.  
Sources: See the text. 
 Table 1 indicates that fiscal centralization took place swiftly and 
permanently throughout much of the continent from 1789 onwards.15
The National Assembly transformed the tax system in France by elimi-
nating traditional exemptions and privileges. Napoleon completed this 
process after the coup in 1799.16 French conquest of Belgium, the Dutch 
Republic, and various Italian polities led to significant administrative 
changes, including tax reform. After defeat in battle by France in 1806, 
Prussia also made major fiscal innovations.  
 Some exceptions bear mention. England had centralized institutions 
from early on. On the other hand, the French failed in their attempts to 
make administrative changes on the Iberian Peninsula: fiscal centraliza-
tion in Portugal and Spain did not happen until 1832 and 1844, respec-
tively. The same is true for Austria-Hungary, where fiscal centralization 
occurred with the Revolutions of 1848. For Scandinavia, I dated fiscal 
centralization in Denmark to the establishment of the cadastre system in 
15 Also see Godechot, Hyslop, and Dowd, Napoleonic Era.
16 See Bordo and White, “Tale,” pp. 314–16; and White, “French Revolution,” pp. 234–41 
and 250–52. 
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1688. Significant fiscal change did not occur in Sweden until 1840, 
however.
From Executive Discretion to Parliamentary Control  
 Sovereigns retained control over expenditures through the end of the 
Napoleonic era. Indeed, the consolidation of fiscal powers by national 
governments may have exacerbated problems of executive discretion. I 
now discuss the second part of our story: effective constraints that  
limited the ways in which rulers could spend public funds. 
 Consider, for example, what happened in the Netherlands. The 1815 
Constitution granted absolutist powers to King Willem I (1815–1840).17
Parliamentary budget authority, which came at ten-year intervals, was 
rendered ineffective. Spending heavily on the military, on infrastruc-
ture, and on the monarchy itself, Willem could not balance the national 
accounts. Though fiscal centralization roughly doubled the size of the 
Dutch tax base and Europe was politically stable, public debt increased 
to more than 200 percent of GDP—a ratio comparable to that during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars—under his reign. The king also 
used semi-legal means to hide the true state of government finances. 
When Willem’s fiscal troubles finally became public in 1839, parlia-
ment vetoed the upcoming decadal budget and the king abdicated his 
throne. The constitutional amendment passed in 1840, replaced the ten-
year budgets with two-year ones, and made information about state fin-
ances readily available. A new constitution, promulgated during the 
Year of Revolutions in 1848, marked the establishment of a truly liberal 
era in the Netherlands. From that point onwards, the crown had to sub-
mit annual budgets to parliament for approval. By instituting a firm 
check on executive spending, the Reform of 1848 became—in the 
words of Jan Luiten Van Zanden and Arthur Van Riel—the cornerstone 
of parliamentary power.18
 Though monarchs spent revenues as they wished, representative  
bodies exercised tax authority. As the well-known example of King 
Charles I (1625–1649) of England demonstrates, rulers hoped to evade 
parliament in the search for greater funds. Forced loans, repaid in highly 
unpredictable ways and in terms altered from original agreements,  
were one major revenue stream for Charles. The king also seized private 
goods such as bullion. Other measures to skirt parliament included  
17 The Kingdom of the United Netherlands, established after the Napoleonic wars, included 
Belgium through 1830. For additional details, see Appendix 2. 
18 Strictures, pp. 32–51, 85–90, 96–110 and 171–78. Also see Fritschy and Van Der Voort, 
“Fragmentation,” pp. 64–66, 73–81 and 85–87; and Fritschy et al., “Continuities,” pp. 20–24. 
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customs impositions and the sale of monopolies, government lands, and 
offices. Charles, moreover, kept parliament in the dark about the state of 
public finances.19 Such predatory fiscal tactics by English monarchs 
continued until the Glorious Revolution.  
 Absolutists thus found themselves locked in a vicious circle. Parlia-
ments rightfully feared that kings would spend additional revenues in 
reckless ways. They therefore demanded limits as a precondition before 
providing new funds. Yet because parliaments were unwilling to bend, 
rulers often resorted to fiscal predation. This misbehavior, of course, 
only reinforced the notion that executives could not be trusted. In turn,  
parliaments fervently resisted tax requests and revenues remained low.  
 Limited government, which generally emerged during the nineteenth 
century, established parliament’s power of the purse. Parliamentary 
control of national budgets reduced the likelihood of poor spending 
choices by rulers. Just as they each had reasons (as in Hoffman and Ro-
senthal) to favor fiscal centralization, both executives and parliaments 
had incentives to establish limits. Centralization meant that monarchs 
would receive greater funds. Surrender of budgetary control was the on-
ly credible way for crowns to guarantee that a portion of new revenues 
would go towards desired public services. So long as executive and  
parliament reached a deal, regimes with low levels of taxation and 
spending were less attractive.20
 Hoffman and Rosenthal claim that limited government arose after 
1800 because of an important change in the nature of warfare. For the 
first time, leaders who failed in battle also faced the risk of losing their 
thrones. Thus, the benefits of higher tax revenues that rulers could use 
to wage war began to outweigh the advantages of absolute control over 
expenditures. As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue, rulers 
may have also gained from nonmilitary forms of spending such as  
the provision of public services or redistribution that prevented social 
unrest.21
 Timing is the key difference between Hoffman and Rosenthal’s ar-
gument and mine. The authors suggest that fiscal centralization and li-
mited government occurred in one fell swoop. My dating scheme, how-
ever, indicates that the two transformations happened in chronological 
order. Though centralization and limited government were interdepen-
dent shifts, it was not until decades after centralization—which was in 
19 Ashton, Crown, pp. 31–67 and 154–84; Stone, Crisis; Hirst, Authority, pp. 126–59; Cust, 
Forced Loan, pp. 39–71 and 99–149; North and Weingast, “Constitutions,” pp. 809–12; Velde 
and Weir, “Financial Market,” p. 6; Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises; and Sacks, “Paradox,” 
pp. 37–44 and 53–65. 
20 Van Zanden and Prak, “Economic Interpretation,” make a similar argument.  
21 “Why did the West?” 
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many cases imposed “exogenously” by the French—that stable limited 
government regimes were established.  
 One obvious reason for this disparity lies in the divergent aims of the 
two studies. Hoffman and Rosenthal wish to explain the broad shift 
from absolutist regimes to parliamentary ones. It is thus useful to con-
sider centralization and limited government as dual parts of a single  
simultaneous change. My intent, by contrast, is to perform a statistical 
analysis that unites various arguments about the importance of political 
transformations. Selection of the “right” dates matters because a choice 
that is too early or too late may lead to false acceptance or rejection  
of the relevant hypotheses. Hence, it is imperative to identify the  
precise years in which centralized as well as limited regimes were first  
established.
 Since budget authority increased over time, a reasonable portrayal of 
limited government must capture parliament’s real power to act. It 
should also be simple enough to apply to all sample countries. My defi-
nition harkens back to the spirit of constitutional reform as expressed by 
North and Weingast. Limited government emerged the year in which 
parliament gained the stable constitutional right to control the national 
budget on an annual basis. For stability, parliament’s power of the purse 
had to hold for at least two consecutive decades. So that dating is as ob-
jective as possible, I have chosen years and regimes for which there is 
widespread consensus. The coding of limited regimes corresponds 
closely to the classification systems used by Charles Tilly, Bradford De 
Long and Andrei Shleifer, Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and Robinson, 
and Keith Jaggers and Monty Marshall.22 Incorporation of these three 
factors—a regular veto right by parliament over the budget, regime sta-
bility, and scholarly agreement—means that political arrangements 
were classified as limited in a manner that closely resembles the  
standard put forth by North and Weingast for England.23 Appendix 1 
documents the details of limited government for each country.  
22 Tilly, Coercion; De Long and Shleifer, “Princes”; Acemoglu et al., “Rise”; and Jaggers and 
Marshall, “Polity IV Project.” None of those schemes, however, fit the particular demands of 
my study. De Long and Shleifer employ three measures: a binary indicator of absolutist versus 
non-absolutist regimes; Putnam’s eight-point constitutional scale; and Tilly’s categories of “cap-
ital” versus “coercion.” Yet De Long and Shleifer code regimes at 150-year intervals. Acemoglu 
et al. use two measures: Polity IV categories of executive constraints and categories of “protec-
tion for capital,” each coded at 100-year (1000–1700) or 50-year (1700–1850) intervals. Moreo-
ver, their computations use 40-year windows around each date, which reduces the precision of 
individual point estimates (e.g., the 1800 value is the average of 1780, 1790, 1800, 1810, and 
1820). Though Jaggers and Marshall classify executive constraints for countries at yearly inter-
vals, their data set does not begin until the nineteenth century.  
23 “Constitutions.” I did not use suffrage measures since I wished to consider effective checks 
on executive spending and not democracy per se. 
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 To bias the evidence against my hypothesis, I have always selected 
an early date to define political regimes as limited. This choice means 
that average revenues associated with limited government will be lower 
than otherwise. For the sake of argument, say that limited government 
did not “truly” emerge in Germany until after World War II and in 
Spain until after Franco’s death in 1975. If so, then the correct method 
would be to categorize pre-twentieth-century Prussian and Spanish data 
as absolutist and post-twentieth-century data as limited. Since public 
revenues in Europe have grown over time, this classification scheme 
would only strengthen any results that limited regimes were associated 
with revenue increases.  
 Limited government was occasionally shaky during the 1800s. Recall 
that my definition sets a minimum threshold for stability by requiring 
that parliament’s constitutional rights held for at least 20 straight years. 
It would be impractical to demand that limited government was a “per-
manent” reform. Moreover, as discussed above, pushing back the years 
for limited government in this way would likely reinforce any findings 
that executive constraints improved public finances. In the regression 
analysis, I also allowed for uncertainty over how long new limited re-
gimes would last by including five-year or ten-year lags on their start 
dates as a robustness check.
 I now present a case study of France to illustrate my dating metho-
dology. Established after Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815, the Bourbon 
regime was limited in name only. Over the next several years, there 
were intense battles between royal and liberal forces. The notion of 
proper governance of Charles X, who acceded to the throne at the start 
of the 1820s, was hardly compatible with constitutional monarchy. In 
1830 he dissolved parliament, reduced the electorate in favor of the 
wealthy, placed the press under government control, and called for new 
elections—measures that incited the July Revolution the next day. Louis 
Phillippe, who replaced the deposed king, agreed to adhere to constitu-
tional limits, but because his reign ended in revolution in 1848—and 
thus lasted for less than two decades—I did not classify it as limited. 
One of the robustness checks, however, categorized it as such. In 1851 
Napoleon III mounted a coup d’etat and established an authoritarian re-
gime that lasted nearly 20 years. The Third French Republic, founded in 
1870, remained until the German invasion of 1940.24 Since this final ar-
rangement best satisfied the triple criteria of regularity, stability, and 
consensus, I dated the emergence of a limited regime in France to 1870.  
24 Jackson, Short History, pp. 143–44 and 150–51; and Price, Concise History, pp. 157–65, 
177–79, and 188–91. 
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TABLE 2  
LIMITED GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 
Country Year Event 
Group 1 
Netherlands 1572 Formation of Dutch Republic (1572–1795) 
1848 Implementation of new constitution  
England 1688 Establishment of constitutional monarchy  
Prussia 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy  
Austria-Hungary 1867 Establishment of constitutional monarchy 
France 1870 Establishment of stable constitutional regime  
Spain 1876 Establishment of stable constitutional monarchy  
Group 2 
Denmark None Absolutism restored (1866) after short-lived  
constitutional regime  
Belgium 1831 Established as a constitutional monarchy  
Portugal 1851 Establishment of stable constitutional monarchy  
Italy 1861 Established as a constitutional monarchy  
Sweden 1866 Dissolution of Estates and introduction of bicameral 
legislature
Notes: The first column lists the sample countries by group, which Table 1 describes. The 
second column displays the year that limited government as defined in the text emerged. The fi-
nal column offers brief “explanations” for the dates, which are elaborated upon in Appendix 1. 
Sources: See the text. 
 In Europe as a whole (as Table 2 indicates), limited government re-
forms began during the 1830s and 1840s, several decades after centrali-
zation. A second wave of limited government reforms occurred in  
the 1860s and 1870s. England, however, was precocious since limits  
on executive spending emerged nearly 150 years earlier. At the other 
extreme, Denmark did not establish a stable constitutional monarchy  
before World War I.  
 Political risks and instability dominated the Iberian Peninsula during 
the nineteenth century. Thus, “liberal” regimes there fit less well with 
traditional notions of limited government. I have dated a limited regime 
in Portugal to 1851 and in Spain to 1876. Since Iberian revenues re-
mained low through the 1800s, this choice biases against the hypothesis 
that constitutional constraints mattered. Classification of the Iberian  
regimes as absolutist would only strengthen any findings that limited 
government was associated with improvements in public finances.  
Implications for Public Finances 
 Table 3 provides a summary of the public finance characteristics  
of the four possible political regimes: fragmented and absolutist, centra-
lized and absolutist, fragmented and limited, and centralized and li-
mited. Note that there was only one example of a fragmented and  
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TABLE 3 
PUBLIC FINANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL REGIMES 
Regime Per Capita Public Revenues 
Fragmented and absolutist Low due to local free riding and lack of credible commitment 
Centralized and absolutist  Increase due to resolution of free riding but still no credible  commitment 
Fragmented and limited  Increase due to credible commitment but still local free riding  
Centralized and limited  High due to resolution of local free riding and credible  commitment 
Sources: See the text. 
limited regime among sample countries.25 Revenues under centralized 
and limited regimes should have been higher than under fragmented and 
absolutist ones. Fiscal centralization implied an increase in revenues 
over fragmentation because it eliminated local free riding. Similarly, 
limited government implied an increase in revenues over absolutism. 
Parliaments were more willing to submit to tax requests since rulers 
could make credible commitments to spend funds on public services  
rather than personal consumption.  
 By the same logic, revenues should have increased under centralized 
and absolutist regimes in comparison with fragmented and absolutist 
ones. They should have also been higher under fragmented and limited 
regimes than under fragmented and absolutist ones. Finally, revenues 
under centralized and limited regimes should have highest of all since 
both sorts of fiscal problems had been resolved.  
REVENUE DATA AND SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
 I assembled a database on annual revenues and population from many 
secondary sources. Chief among them were Bonney’s European State 
Finance Database (ESFDB) for the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries and Brian Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics (IHS) for 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Appendix 2 documents the 
data sources and construction methods for each sample country.  
 The historical data had certain limitations. Since European countries 
did not maintain detailed financial records during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the time series may be imprecise. Bonney shows 
that governments may have calculated annual revenues in several  
25 This was the Dutch Republic (1572–1795). For additional details, see the section, “Political 
Regimes and Public Revenues.”  
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different ways.26 I have done my best to stick to income from tax re-
ceipts for a given year. When feasible, ordinary and extraordinary fig-
ures were added together and loan income was subtracted in order to de-
termine total revenues. Since the various ways in which monarchs 
tabulated annual revenue streams prior to the 1800s suggest that they 
typically overestimated the amount of financial resources available to 
them, average revenues associated with fragmented and absolutist  
regimes should be larger than otherwise. In turn, the empirical frame-
work biases against the hypotheses that fiscal centralization and limited 
government were associated with significant revenue increases.
 The revenue data also came in different currencies. To make calcula-
tions comparable across countries, I transformed all units into grams  
of gold. In addition, some observations were missing. Those years were  
linearly interpolated. Since most instances of fiscal change save centra-
lization during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic times were gradual, 
interpolations should provide reasonable estimates. I interpolated popu-
lation data between census years as well. Since major population shocks 
such as plague did not occur for the period under consideration, the  
previous logic also applies.
 I have divided the sample into two groups based on data availability 
and historical importance. Annual published series of nearly two centu-
ries or more for revenues as well as a variety of controls typically  
exist for the six polities (Austria-Hungary, England, France, the Nether-
lands, Prussia, and Spain) that comprise the first group. These countries 
were among the largest and most powerful players in Western Europe  
at the time, and for them data were available over a variety of political 
regimes.27
 Shorter published time series exist for the five countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden) in the second group. Revenue 
data for Belgium and Italy only began after they were founded as  
constitutional monarchies in 1831 and 1861, respectively. Annual series 
for Portugal and Sweden did not start until after the establishment of 
centralized and limited regimes during the 1800s.28 Denmark never 
26 Economic Systems, pp. 423–506. For instance, one method computed annual budgets with 
revenues that the crown intended to raise even if the money did not actually enter its coffers un-
til years later. 
27 Though the ESFDB lists revenue data for Austria for the eighteenth century, the population 
figures did not become available until 1818. 
28 The Portuguese revenue series became available in 1852 and the Swedish one in 1881. 
Though the ESFDB lists Swedish revenue data from 1722–1809, there were no series available 
from 1810 onwards.  
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TABLE 4  
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PER CAPITA REVENUE DATA  
(in grams of gold) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
All regimes  1515  8.70  7.13  0.26 42.04 
Fragmented and absolutist   429  2.40  1.36  0.26 6.27 
Centralized and absolutist   297  7.68  4.67  1.01 24.38 
Fragmented and limited   76  12.15  1.16  7.76 15.29 
Centralized and limited   713  12.56  7.57  0.83 42.04 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
achieved a stable form of limited government by 1913. It thus func-
tioned as an additional “absolutist” control in the regressions.29 Data 
prior to political transformations was not available for the second set of 
countries. Despite these limitations, including these countries enriches 
the sample by expanding the range of institutional experiences.
POLITICAL REGIMES AND PUBLIC REVENUES 
 Table 4 displays the summary statistics for the revenue panel. In to-
tal, there are 1,515 observations, 429 for fragmented and absolutist re-
gimes, 297 for centralized and absolutist ones, and 713 for centralized 
and limited ones.30 Seventy-six observations characterize the lone frag-
mented and limited regime. What jumps out is the large average per ca-
pita revenues associated with centralized and absolutist regimes (7.68 
grams of gold) and centralized and limited ones (12.56 grams of gold) 
relative to those of fragmented and absolutist ones (2.40 grams of gold). 
Per capita revenues for the fragmented and limited regime (12.15 grams 
of gold) are also significantly higher.
 Before moving on to the statistical analysis, it is worthwhile to study 
France and the Netherlands, two sample polities for which long runs of 
data are available. Figure 1, which plots annual per capita revenues over 
political regimes in France from 1650 to 1913, indicates that revenues 
remained low at less than 5 grams of gold per capita under the frag-
mented and absolutist regime that lasted through the 1780s. The French 
Revolution (1789–1799) led to the establishment of a national tax system. 
29 The ESFDB database lists revenues for Denmark from 1710–1806, but there were no series 
available from 1806–1840.  
30 Among Group 1 countries there are 1,245 observations, 429 for fragmented and absolutist 
regimes (average per capita revenues = 2.40 grams of gold), 256 for centralized and absolutist 
ones (7.20), 484 for centralized and limited ones (13.35), and 76 observations for the frag-
mented and limited regime (12.15).  
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FIGURE 1
YEARLY PER CAPITA REVENUES, FRANCE, 1650–1913 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
Coinciding in time with the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, we ob-
serve a sharp increase in revenues through 1815, which doubled to ap-
proximately 10 grams of gold per head. Over the next two decades, 
French revenues leveled out but never fell. Revenues again began to in-
crease in the 1840s—albeit at a slower rate than during Napoleonic 
times—to almost 20 grams of gold per capita by the end of the 1860s.31
With the establishment of a centralized and limited regime in 1870, we 
observe another sharp increase in revenues, which doubled over the 
next four decades to 40 grams of gold per head by the start of World 
War I.32
 The Dutch Republic (1572–1795) was unique among sample coun-
tries in that each of its seven provinces had separate systems of adminis-
tration, representation, and taxation. The fragmented nature of fiscal  
institutions at the national level contrasted with those in Holland, the 
wealthiest and most heavily populated province, where the local gov-
ernment established a centralized tax system in 1574 by extending 
common taxes from urban areas to rural ones. In turn, the province  
31 As a robustness check I eliminated 1855—where revenues jumped by roughly 9 grams of 
gold per capita—in the regression analysis. Also see the section, “Evidence.”  
32 For additional historical details, refer back to the section, “Political Regimes in Europe.”  
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reduced local free riding and greatly increased its collection of per  
capita revenues.33
 The Dutch case well illustrates why it is difficult to draw meaningful 
distinctions between the terms “limited” and “absolutist” before the ni-
neteenth century. Though typically considered “constitutional,” the re-
public was not limited in the sense of a parliament that monitored ex-
ecutive spending.34 I have designated the national political regime in the 
Dutch Republic as fragmented and limited and the provincial one in 
Holland as centralized and limited.35
 Figure 2 plots annual per capita revenues over political regimes in  
the Netherlands from 1719 to 1913. The results are consistent with  
the notion that the republic benefited from its constitution. In the eigh-
teenth century, federal revenues exceeded those in absolutist France by  
around 5 to 7 grams of gold per head per year. For the 1700s, I also 
constructed a separate revenue series for centralized Holland. Compari-
son with the fragmented federal regime reveals a striking difference:  
per capita revenues in Holland were around 5 to 8 grams of gold higher 
each year.36
 Fiscal centralization occurred at the national level in 1806. The 
Kingdom of the United Netherlands, which emerged at the end of the 
Napoleonic era, invested King Willem I with absolutist powers. The 
move to absolutism appears to have offset any gains from centraliza-
tion. Though Wantje Fritschy notes a 20 percent increase in revenues 
after 1806, Figure 2 suggests that per capita revenues over the length of 
the absolutist regime were 2 to 6 grams of gold lower than in the pre-
1795 Republic.37 Comparison with eighteenth-century Holland indicates 
33 Fritschy, “Financial Revolution Reconsidered,” argues that a tax revolution (i.e., fiscal cen-
tralization) rather than a fiscal one as suggested by Dickson, Financial Revolution, and Tracy, 
Habsburg Netherlands, gave rise to the Dutch fiscal state. Also see t’Hart, “Cities,” pp. 666–70 
and “Merits,” pp. 14–16; Van Zanden and Prak, “Economic Intepretation,” pp. 129–35; and 
Fritschy, “Efficiency,” pp. 1–4.  
34 To provide a credible commitment to repay debts, ruling elites invested heavily in govern-
ment debts, which aligned lender and borrower incentives. See t’Hart, “Cities,” pp. 678–79 and 
“Merits,” pp. 17–27; Fritschy and Van Der Voort, “Fragmentation,” pp. 70–75 and 92; Fritschy 
et al., “Continuities,” pp. 2–4; and Van Zanden and Van Riel, Strictures, p. 35. 
35 This characterization matches up with Tilly, Coercion; De Long and Shleifer, “Princes”; 
Acemoglu et al., “Rise”; and Stasavage, “Cities.”  
36 Also see Van Zanden and Prak, “Economic Interpretation,” pp. 129–35; and Fritschy, “Ef-
ficiency.” All Dutch provinces were required to pay a quota amount towards collective military 
expenditures. Holland was responsible for almost 60 percent of the total burden. Van Zanden 
and Van Riel, Strictures, argue that other provinces typically shirked their obligations and free 
rode on Holland’s contributions.  
37 “Efficiency,” p. 3.  
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FIGURE 2
YEARLY PER CAPITA REVENUES, NETHERLANDS, 1720–1913 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
that revenues under the absolutist regime fell by half.38 The Revolutions 
of 1848 saw the establishment of a centralized and limited regime 
throughout the Netherlands. In turn, Dutch revenues grew steadily, 
reaching approximately 15 grams per capita by the 1870s. This level  
resembled that of the centralized and limited regime in Holland one 
hundred years before.39
 To supplement the case studies, it is useful to examine the rest of the 
data. Figures 3 through 6 plot annual per capita revenues over political 
regimes for other Group 1 countries. English revenues nearly doubled in 
the years that followed the establishment of limited government in 
1688. Considerable revenue increases were associated with fiscal  
centralization and limited government in Austria-Hungary, Prussia, and 
Spain as well. 
38 At its establishment, the Kingdom of the United Netherlands included southern provinces 
like Belgium, which declared independence in 1831. To compute Dutch revenues, I subtracted 
average net Belgian transfers per year from 1815–1830, which resulted in the small 1820s 
trough evident in Figure 2. Fritschy et al., “Continuities,” pp. 20–22, note that the loss of Bel-
gium was devastating because it made significant tax contributions. For additional details, see 
Appendix 2.  
39 For additional historical details, refer back to the section, “Political Regimes in Europe.” 
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FIGURE 3 
YEARLY PER CAPITA REVENUES, BRITAIN, 1650–1789 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
 The Group 1 evidence suggests that fundamental changes in political 
structures improved public finances. It is not definitive, however. Figure 
7, which plots annual per capita revenues for Group 2 countries from 
1800 to 1913, highlights the importance of controls for factors besides 
political institutions. The smallest revenue streams were associated with 
the limited regime in Portugal. Though limited regimes in Belgium and 
Italy performed markedly better than the absolutist one in Denmark, 
there was no clear difference in revenue levels between the Danish  
regime and its limited counterpart in Sweden. To account for economic, 
geographic, institutional, and political effects, I now turn to a more  
rigorous quantitative analysis.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL REGIMES 
Panel Regressions 
 Estimations of panel data increase informative content by combining 
variations across time and country. There are three econometric con-
cerns particular to this sort of data: contemporaneously correlated er-
rors, panel heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation. One technique 
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FIGURE 4 
YEARLY PER CAPITA REVENUES, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 1818–1910 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
that corrects for such problems is feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS). FGLS is “feasible” because it employs an estimate of an un-
known error process. However, Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz 
show that this approach often leads to poor estimates of standard er-
rors.40 They suggest the use of ordinary least squares with “panel-
corrected” standard errors (PCSE) instead. I followed the advice of 
Beck and Katz and employed PCSE that corrects for contemporaneous-
ly correlated errors and panel heteroskedasticity along with a common 
AR1 term to control for serial correlation.41 The fact that OLS is less  
40 “What to Do.” However, time frames such as mine that are very long relative to the number 
of sample countries should offset the poor statistical properties of FGLS.  
41 Use of a lagged dependent variable model following Beck and Katz, “Nuisance,” is another 
way to correct for serial correlation. This procedure generates results statistically similar to 
those reported in the section, “Evidence.” A second alternative would be to take first differenc-
es. However, as Wooldridge notes in Introductory Econometrics, this approach greatly reduces 
the variation in the independent variables. Military spending dominated national budgets 
through the nineteenth century. Though theory says that political transformations increased the 
ability of sovereigns to raise wartime revenues, subsequent decreases at conflict’s end often ne-
gated such effects. The use of an AR1 error term or lagged dependent variable is thus preferable 
in this context. According to Wooldridge, the fact that the time series for Group 1 countries 
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FIGURE 5
YEARLY PER CAPITA REVENUES, PRUSSIA, 1688–1913 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
efficient than FGLS means that the results of the regressions will be 
stronger if we still find significant coefficients attached to the variables 
of interest. The FLGS approach, it should be noted, delivered results 
that were statistically similar if not stronger than those reported.
 The basic fixed effects regression specification is
ln Revit = ȕ0 + ȕ1 CA regimeit + ȕ2 FL regimeit+ ȕ3 CL regimeit     (1) 
+ Ȗ Xit + Countryi + İit
where Revit is per capita revenue in grams of gold for country i in year t,
X is a vector of control variables to be described, and İit is the distur-
bance term. I used dummy variables for centralized and absolutist (CA),
fragmented and limited (FL), and centralized and limited (CL) regimes 
relative to fragmented and absolutist ones as a clear and simple method 
to measure the impact of political arrangements on revenues.  
 Beck claims that well-specified models often do not require fixed ef-
fects by unit or time.42 Ideally, one wishes to explain effects in terms of 
were very long also favored such methods. Finally, Beck and Katz, “What to Do,” show that use 
of a common ȡ to control for serial correlation is superior to that of unit-specific ones.  
42 “Time Series Cross-Section Methods.” 
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FIGURE 6 
YEARLY PER CAPITA REVENUES, SPAIN, 1703–1913 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
substantive variables rather than conclude that revenues were larger in 
say England simply because it was England. I still chose, however, to 
include country fixed effects that captured constant but unmeasured 
economic, geographic, institutional, or political features of individual 
sovereignties. I did not use yearly fixed effects because in my data set 
the number of annual observations for Group 1 countries typically ex-
ceeded 200. Both William Greene and Jeffrey Wooldridge argue that 
the large cost in terms of lost degrees of freedom makes it difficult to 
justify yearly fixed effects in such cases.43 I did, however, implement 
time controls that captured widespread shocks such as warfare and 
changes in the cumulative world stock of gold.44
 The effect of military conflict on public finances cannot be over-
stated. Hoffman and Rosenthal claim that the one true goal of early
43 Greene, Econometric Analysis; and Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics. Indeed, 
Wooldridge notes that time dummies are best employed when the ratio of observations across 
year T for each country i is small relative to the total number of countries N. Here the T to N ra-
tio for Group 1 countries typically exceeded 40.  
44 The qualitative findings were generally robust to the inclusion of time dummies at 1, 10, 
25, or 50-year intervals.  
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FIGURE 7 
YEARLY PER CAPITA REVENUES, GROUP 2 COUNTRIES, 1800–1913 
Source: See Appendix 2. 
modern rulers was to wage war for royal glory and homeland defense.45
In the 1800s Niall Ferguson argues that political events were more im-
portant to investors than economic ones because there was a greater 
amount of regular information available about them.46 One may imagine 
that revenue levels increased during conflicts themselves but fell just af-
terwards. The previous authors claim that the total effect of warfare on 
public finances was negative due to the destruction that it caused. 
Charles Tilly, Hoffman and Norberg, Epstein, Patrick O’Brien, Rosen-
thal and R. Bin Wong, and others, however, argue that over the long 
run, military competition fostered financial innovations that allowed  
sovereigns to raise larger tax amounts.47 Structural changes would  
suggest that revenues remained permanently higher after war’s end. 
Whether a country won or lost a conflict also influenced revenue levels. 
So long as the defeated country took more casualties, then the reduction 
in its tax base would have been more severe. 
45 ”Political Economy of Warfare.” Military expenditures were also sizeable during the nine-
teenth century. Lindert, Growing Public, shows that there was little spending on social programs 
of any kind before the 1900s. 
46 ”Political Risk.” Sussman and Yafeh, “Country Risk” and “Financial Development,” also 
find that investors responded quickly to civil unrest and wars in eighteenth-century Britain and 
Meiji-era Japan. 
47 Tilly, Coercion; Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises; Epstein, Freedom; O’Brien, “Fiscal 
Exceptionalism”; and Rosenthal and Wong, Warfare.
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 Not all conflicts were created equal, however. Two important charac-
teristics were the strength of the enemy and the scope of the war. An 
ideal measure of opponent size would be total revenues and expendi-
tures. Unfortunately, this approach suffers from endogeneity. One may 
envision an “arms race,” where the home country repeatedly ratcheted 
up wartime revenues (and so expenditures) to counteract sequential in-
creases by its adversaries. Debt figures would also be useful to assess 
the pressure of warfare on public finances, but continuous series were 
not available. To proxy for debt overhang, one could employ the mili-
tary’s share of total expenditures at war’s end. As Hoffman and Rosen-
thal point out, however, warfare was by far the largest component of na-
tional budgets through the nineteenth century.48 Thus, military size as 
well as total expenditures fell rapidly in the years just after wars.  
 To evaluate the impact of warfare on public revenues, I constructed a 
new data set based on Micheal Clodfelter.49 Appendix 3 documents the 
details. I included all conflicts fought at least in part in Western Europe 
(as well as those fought at least in part in Eastern Europe so long as they 
involved at least one sample country) from 1650 to 1913. I used coali-
tion populations as simple measures of opponent strength that avoided 
endogeneity problems. Totals were computed as sums of available pop-
ulations of coalition countries in the years that conflicts began. To 
gauge the scope of war, I calculated average military deaths per conflict 
year.50 In certain years, sample countries were involved in two or more 
wars. Both (i.e., nonoverlapping) coalition totals and average deaths 
were summed in such cases.  
 Table 5 summarizes the control variables. The average conflict  
involved coalition populations of more than 25 million and 50,000  
military deaths per year. The smallest coalition (1.16 million) was com-
prised of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the conquest by Austria-
Hungary in 1878. The largest (87.56 million) was comprised of the 
combined populations for Austria-Hungary, France, and Spain during 
the First Italian War of Independence from 1848 to 1849. The least 
deadly conflict was the Spanish War from 1727 to 1729, with 269  
military deaths per annum. The deadliest single year occurred in 1809, 
when military deaths for the Peninsular and Austrian fronts of the  
Napoleonic Wars totaled 600,000.
48 “Political Economy of Warfare.” 
49 Warfare.
50 The historical nature of the data means that the casualty figures should be interpreted as es-
timates rather than absolutes. For additional details, see Appendix 3.  
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TABLE 5  
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Enemy coalition population  
(in millions) 26.42 16.40 1.16 87.56 
Military deaths per conflict year  
(in thousands) 50.29 89.00 0.27 600.00 
Urbanization rate   0.16 0.10 0.04 0.46 
Change in gold stock  
(in millions of troy ounces) 2.69 4.67 0.23 22.67 
Sources: See Appendices 3 and 4. 
 We must also consider the impact of domestic turmoil. One may ex-
pect that internal chaos caused disruptions that reduced revenue flows. 
To measure this effect, I assembled a data set identifying all civil wars, 
coups, and revolutions that occurred within sample countries from 1650 
to 1913. Appendix 4 provides the details. In the regression analysis, I 
included a dummy variable that took a value of one for each year of  
internal conflict.  
 One may suppose that economic growth increased tax bases and 
enabled sovereign governments to collect larger revenues as well. Since 
reliable GDP figures are difficult to come by before 1820, many studies 
of the late nineteenth century employ measures of foreign trade as ap-
proximates of national output.51 However, systematic trade deficit and 
export series from the 1600s onwards were not available. Paul Hohen-
berg and Lynn Lees, Paul Bairoch, and Acemoglu et al. argue that there 
was a close relationship between urbanization rates and income 
growth.52 To proxy for per capita GDP, I constructed a yearly variable 
that calculated urban populations as fractions of total populations for 
each country. Appendix 4 describes the details.53 Note that controls for 
national income also helped account for different rates of technological 
innovation and adoption across countries.54 Table 5 indicates that on 
average urban populations comprised 16 percent of total populations. 
The lowest urbanization rates were 4 percent for Prussia during the 
1700s and the largest were over 40 percent for England from the 1870s 
onwards.
 Recall that I converted currency units into grams of gold. This trans-
formation should reduce any effects of inflation. Though the world 
51 See for instance, Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh, “Emerging Market Spreads”; Obstfeld and 
Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”; and Ferguson and Schularick, “Empire Effect.” 
52 Hohenberg and Lees, Making; Bairoch, Cities; and Acemoglu et al., “Reversal” and “Rise.”  
53 Per capita GDP figures from Maddison, World Economy, were used as a robustness check. 
54 See Mokyr, Second Industrial Revolution and British Industrial Revolution. I examine the 
role of the Industrial Revolution in the section, “Evidence.” 
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stock of gold remained stable through the start of the nineteenth cen-
tury, large discoveries in California in 1848 and in Australia in 1851 
had a dramatic effect on output.55 I employed data from François Velde 
and Warren Weber to account for annual changes in the cumulative 
gold stock in millions of troy ounces from 1650 to 1913.56 Table 5 indi-
cates that the gold stock increased by an average of 2.69 million troy 
ounces per year. The smallest single year change (230,000 troy ounces) 
occurred between 1650 and 1651 and the biggest (22.67 million troy 
ounces) occurred between 1911 and 1912.
 The econometric setup assumes that it is possible to disentangle polit-
ical regimes from factors such as violent conflicts and economic fun-
damentals. Since political arrangements influenced all of these characte-
ristics, coefficients on the control variables rather than those on the 
regime ones themselves may capture some of the positive effects of in-
stitutional reforms. Hence, regime coefficients likely underestimate the 
total impact of political arrangements on public revenues.  
Structural Breaks  
 Structural breaks tests, which assume no a priori knowledge of major 
turning points in the revenue series, are another relevant technique. By 
allowing the data to “speak” for themselves, breaks tests offer a useful 
alternative to standard regression analysis.57 I use the methodology pro-
posed by Jushan Bai and Pierre Perron that identifies multiple structural 
changes in means while allowing for serial correlation.58 It thus im-
proves upon the “moving windows” technique that relies upon sequen-
tial single structural change methods. Since I am interested in turning 
points associated with political transformations, I apply the method to 
Group 1 countries only. 
 A program created for the Regression Analysis of Time Series 
(RATS) software performs the Bai-Perron procedure, which considers 
the following regression for each sample polity in Group 1 
ln Revt = ȕ0 + l=1,…,L ȕl ln rt–l + İt       (2) 
where Revt is per capita revenue in grams of gold in year t, ȕ0 and ȕ1
through ȕL are parameters to be estimated, and İt is the disturbance 
55 Morys, “Emergence,” pp. 30–32. 
56 “Bimetallism.” 
57 For historical applications, see among others Willard et al., “Turning Points”; Brown and 
Burdekin, “British Perspective”; Sussman and Yafeh, “Country Risk”; Mauro, Sussman, and 
Yafeh, “Emerging Market Spreads”; and Dincecco, “Political Regimes.”  
58 “Computation.”  
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term. I allowed up to five significant yearly lags l of the dependent vari-
able (L = 5). The RATS routine, which uses a dynamic programming 
algorithm to evaluate which final partitioning of the time series data 
achieves a global minimization of the overall sum of squared residuals, 
returns the optimal set of break points.  
 The routine calls for the selection of a maximum number of “best” 
turning points in the time series for each country subject to a minimum 
number of observations between data segments. As Kristen Willard, 
Timothy Guinnane, and Harvey Rosen point out, there is always a 
trade-off in determining parameter values.59 A minimum space of two 
observations eliminates the chance of confounding the effects of differ-
ent events, but ends up analyzing blips (i.e., false positives that charac-
terize certain events as “long-lasting” that really were not) rather than 
turning points.60 Longer time periods of analysis, however, increase the 
likelihood of missing important shifts (i.e., false negatives). After some 
experimentation, I selected the best five breaks from 1650 to 1913 with 
at least 25 observations (i.e., 25 years) per segment.61 As mentioned 
above, there is a gap in the revenue series for the Netherlands that coin-
cides with the fall of the republic in 1795 and prevents the identification 
of a turning point associated with fiscal centralization in 1806. I thus 
chose the best three breaks with at least ten observations (i.e., 10  
years) per segment over the nineteenth century, when the Netherlands  
established parliamentary government. The per capita revenue series for  
Austria-Hungary, which did not begin until 1818, required similar  
parameters. For robustness, I also applied this framework to the  
other Group 1 countries (France, Prussia, and Spain) that experienced  
political transitions during the 1800s.  
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
 Table 6, which displays the results of regression 1, reveals that frag-
mented and absolutist regimes collected significantly less revenue per 
capita than any of the other regime types. The findings held for both 
Group 1 countries only (column 1) and when Group 2 countries were 
included (column 2).62 Ceteris paribus, the move to a centralized and 
absolutist regime increased revenues by 22 to 25 percent, the move to  
59 “Turning Points.”  
60 I did not analyze short-lived breaks since I was interested in persistent changes.  
61 I also set the maximum number of breaks to three or four and the minimum number of ob-
servations to 15 or 20. The findings were generally robust to such changes in parameter values.  
62 Restricting the sample to continental countries did not significantly affect the results, 
either.  
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TABLE 6 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR POLITICAL REGIMES AND PUBLIC REVENUES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Group 1 Only, 
1650–1913
Groups 1 
and 2, 
1650–1913
Group 1 Only, 
1650–1850
Centralized and absolutist regimes 0.2481***
(4.83) 
0.2215***
(5.63) 
0.2207*** 
(3.59) 
Fragmented and limited regime 0.6261***
(6.82) 
0.5886***
(5.71) 
0.3578*** 
(3.54) 
Centralized and limited regimes 0.6538***
(10.19) 
0.6206***
(12.16) 
0.6177*** 
(6.65) 
Military deaths per year  
(in thousands) 
–0.00015 
(1.53) 
–0.00016* 
(1.91) 
–0.00007 
(0.56) 
Enemy coalition population  
(in millions) 
0.00092***
(2.45) 
0.00094***
(3.08) 
0.00084 
(1.48) 
Domestic conflict –0.0660***
(3.05) 
–0.0633***
(3.73) 
–0.0849*** 
(2.90) 
Urbanization rate 1.4146***
(7.74) 
1.3204***
(7.19) 
1.4256*** 
(5.52) 
Change in gold stock  
(in millions of troy ounces) 
0.0363***
(7.36) 
0.0355***
(9.01) 
0.0426 
(1.70) 
Austria-Hungary 0.0289 
(0.27) 
0.0057 
(0.07) 
–0.2373 
(1.46) 
France 0.2249***
(3.11) 
0.1922***
(3.08) 
0.0625 
(0.73) 
Netherlands 0.2260***
(3.57) 
0.2330***
(2.94) 
0.5152*** 
(5.48) 
Prussia –0.2452***
(3.68) 
–0.2807***
(4.07) 
–0.2445*** 
(2.69) 
Spain –1.4494***
(13.77) 
–1.4832***
(14.32) 
–1.5162*** 
(12.88) 
Belgium  0.2596***
(4.75) 
Denmark  0.3583***
(3.49) 
Italy  0.1836***
(2.58) 
Portugal  –1.6905***
(16.37) 
Sweden  –0.1707 
(1.65) 
Constant 1.1358***
(15.26) 
1.1916***
(16.13) 
1.1229*** 
(11.87) 
Observations 1218 1484 848 
R2 0.372 0.396 0.463 
Wald Ȥ2 1360.57 2171.89 1750.88 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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TABLE 6– continued 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of per capita revenues in grams of gold. 
The estimation technique is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). It controls for 
contemporaneously correlated errors and panel heteroskedasticity. A common AR1 term was 
included to correct for serial correlation. Z-statistics in absolute values are in parentheses. Group 
1: Austria-Hungary, England, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Spain. Group 2: Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. The dummy variable for fragmented and absolutist polit-
ical regimes takes a value of one for each year that a sample country possessed a fragmented 
and absolutist regime. As the benchmark case, it was omitted from the regression specifications. 
The dummy for centralized and absolutist (fragmented and limited; centralized and limited) re-
gimes takes a value of one for each year that a sample country possessed a centralized and abso-
lutist (fragmented and limited; centralized and limited) regime. The dummy for domestic con-
flict takes a value of one for the year(s) during any civil war, coup, and revolution within 
sample countries. The country dummies take a value of one to identify individual sample coun-
tries. Urbanization rates are measured as fractions of urban to total populations. For additional 
details about the regression variables, see Appendices 3 and 4. 
Sources: See the text. 
the fragmented and limited one by 59 to 63 percent, and the move to a 
centralized and limited one by 62 to 65 percent.63 Specifications with 
gross revenues as the dependent variable and population, urbanization 
rates, and a population-urbanization interaction term as independent  
variables delivered results statistically similar to those reported. The 
findings were also robust to checks that eliminated any “abnormal”  
observations and used alternative regime classifications as described  
before.64
 What about the control variables? The destruction that warfare 
caused as measured by average military deaths per conflict year had a 
small negative effect on per capita revenues. Opponent size as proxied 
by coalition populations, however, had a significant positive effect. The 
results suggest that national governments responded to enemy strength: 
a country that faced the largest recorded coalition (82.5 million) rather 
than the smallest one (2.15 million) would have increased revenues by 
around 7 percent.65 Domestic turmoil (civil wars, coups, and revolu-
tions) led to a significant reduction in revenues (6 to 7 percent lower 
than during periods of internal peace). Economic growth (as proxied by 
urbanization rates) had a significant positive impact.66 A country with 
the largest recorded urbanization rate (0.49) rather than the smallest one 
63 Recall from the section, “Political Regimes in Europe” that the Dutch Republic was the on-
ly example of a fragmented and limited regime among sample countries.
64 I counted as abnormal any year for which there was an increase in per capita revenues of 5 
or more grams of gold from the previous year that was not sustained over the next five years. 
This was France in 1855. Also see the section, “Political Regimes.” 
65 An interaction term between average military deaths and coalition population was never 
statistically significant and so I did not include it in the reported results.  
66 Use of per capita GDP figures rather than urbanization rates did not significantly affect the 
findings.
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(0.04) would have increased revenues by around 60 percent. The effect 
of changes in the cumulative world gold stock was also significant. A 
per year increase of one million troy ounces led to a 4 percent increase 
in revenues. France (19 to 22 percent higher) and the Netherlands (23 
percent higher) had much larger revenues per head than England, as did 
Belgium (26 percent higher), Denmark (36 percent higher), and Italy 
(18 percent higher) among Group 2 countries. Prussia (25 to 28 percent 
lower) and Spain (145 to 148 percent lower), on the other hand, had 
much smaller per capita revenues than England, as did Portugal (169 
percent lower) among Group 2 countries.  
 Before moving to the structural breaks, it is useful to take a second 
look at the impact of economic growth. Joel Mokyr characterizes the In-
dustrial Revolution in two phases. The first occurred in Britain from 
roughly 1750 to 1825. The second occurred in Western Europe and North 
America from roughly 1850 to 1913.67 Though limited government was 
established in England prior to phase one, it typically emerged on the 
continent during or after the start of phase two.  
 Recall that I have controlled for income effects in the regressions by 
including urbanization rates as an independent variable. To reduce the 
impact of the second Industrial Revolution, I also ran the same set of re-
gressions on Group 1 countries for the period before 1850. As column 3 
of Table 6 shows, political transformations towards centralized and li-
mited regimes continued to be associated with significant increases in per 
capita revenues.68
 A brief review of the transformations that occurred prior to the nine-
teenth century also proves helpful. Recall that per capita revenues in-
creased quickly in the years that followed fiscal centralization in France 
in 1790 (Figure 1). In addition, a second glance at the Dutch case indi-
cates that revenues in centralized Holland were a great deal larger than in 
the fragmented republic as a whole (Figure 2). Finally, we observe a sig-
nificant increase in revenues after the establishment of limited govern-
ment in England in 1688 (Figure 3). The pre-1800 evidence thus suggests 
that political regimes had important effects on public revenues indepen-
dent of economic growth associated with the Industrial Revolution.  
 Table 7, which displays the results of the structural breaks tests de-
scribed in equation 2 from 1650 to 1913, reveals close relationships 
67 Second Industrial Revolution, p. 1; and British Industrial Revolution, p. 4.  
68 Since the vast majority of regime shifts occurred during the 1800s, this approach became 
impractical further back in time. Nonetheless, centralized and absolutist and centralized and li-
mited regimes were still associated with significant revenue increases for periods that ended in 
1820, 1830, and 1840.  
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TABLE 7 
MAJOR BREAKS IN PER CAPITA REVENUE SERIES, 1650–1913 
Country  Year Percent Change Event 
England  1685 59.66*** 
(3.87) 
 Limited government (1688)/ 
War of Grand Alliance (1688–1697) 
   1711 11.39*** 
(2.88) 
 War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714) 
  1797 52.26*** 
(7.23) 
 Start of Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) 
  1822 –18.35*** 
(5.05) 
 End of Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815)  
  1879 4.49** 
(2.60) 
 Second Afghan War (1878–1880)/ 
Zulu War (1879)  
      
France  1697 –10.97*** 
(3.06) 
 End of War of Grand Alliance  
(1688–1697)
  1722 –0.79 
(0.08) 
 Law Affair (1716–1720) 
  1758 8.90 
(0.75) 
 Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) 
  1793 –13.13 
(0.75) 
 Fiscal centralization (1790)/ 
French Revolution (1789–1799) 
  1869 39.52*** 
(6.06) 
 Limited government (1870)/ 
Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) 
      
Prussia  1713 92.60*** 
(5.86) 
 Great Northern War (1700–1721)  
  1741 –22.49*** 
(6.52) 
 End of War of Polish Succession  
(1733–1735)
  1771 –25.97*** 
(3.78) 
 End of Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) 
  1806 145.42*** 
(8.31) 
 Fiscal centralization (1806)/ 
Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) 
  1831 –6.59*** 
(4.94) 
 First Zollverein Customs Union (1834)  
      
Spain  1757 5.79 
(1.08) 
 Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) 
  1783 32.21*** 
(5.42) 
 Tupac Amaru Rebellion in Peru  
(1780–1783)
  1814 15.57 
(0.72) 
 End of Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) 
  1841 33.92*** 
(3.36) 
 Fiscal centralization (1844)/ 
First Carlist War (1833–1839) 
  1872 25.63** 
(2.20) 
 Limited government (1876)/ 
Third Carlist War (1872–1876) 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: The first column lists the relevant Group 1 sample countries. The second column 
displays the years for the best five structural breaks from 1650–1913 for each polity as deter-
mined by the algorithm described in the text. The third column reports the percentage change in 
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TABLE 7– continued
average per capita revenues over the ten years following the break in question as compared to 
the ten years that preceded it. T-statistics in absolute values are in parentheses. The final column 
offers brief “explanations” for the turning points, which are elaborated upon in the text. 
Sources: See the text. 
between major turning points and political transformations that en-
hanced public finances. It also highlights the link between those innova-
tions and military competition and conflicts.69 In England, the break that 
occurred in 1685 coincided with the establishment of limited govern-
ment during the Glorious Revolution as well as the start of the War of 
the Grand Alliance. This change led to a 60 percent increase in average 
per capita revenues over the following decade. Other turning points in 
the English revenue series came with the War of the Spanish Succession 
(1711), near the start (1797) and end (1822) of the Napoleonic Wars, 
and with various colonial wars (1880). In France, the best breaks were 
associated with the end of the War of the Grand Alliance (1697), the 
Law Affair (1722), the Seven Years’ War (1758), fiscal centralization 
(1793), and limited government (1869). The chaos of the French Revo-
lution (1789–1799) swamped any jump in revenues just after fiscal cen-
tralization. Figure 1, however, shows that French revenues grew rapidly 
by the start of the 1800s. Limited government, which coincided with the 
Franco-Prussian War, led to a 40 percent increase in revenues. In Spain, 
we observe turning points with the Seven Years’ War (1757), a colonial 
conflict (1783) that foreshadowed the South American Wars of Inde-
pendence, the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1814), fiscal centralization 
(1841), and limited government (1872). Both political transformations, 
which occurred during times of domestic turmoil or warfare, led to  
revenue increases of 25 to 35 percent.
 Table 8, which displays the results of the structural breaks tests for 
the nineteenth century, supports the previous analysis. Limited govern-
ment (1869) was again a major turning point in the French per capita 
revenue series. A second break in 1854 followed the Revolution of 1848 
and subsequent coup by Napoleon III in 1851. In Spain, two of the  
three best breaks over the 1800s were associated with political trans-
formations. The turning point in 1838 came near the time of fiscal  
centralization, while the 1872 break just preceded limited government.  
 Breaks for Prussia occurred with its entry into the Great Northern 
War (1713), in the aftermath of the War of the Polish Succession (1741) 
and the Seven Years’ War (1771), with fiscal centralization (1806), and  
69 As cited in the section, “Estimating the Effect.”  
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TABLE 8 
MAJOR BREAKS IN PER CAPITA REVENUE SERIES OVER THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY
Country  Year  Percent Change Event 
Austria-Hungary   1849 44.97*** 
(4.14) 
 Fiscal centralization (1848)/ 
Year of Revolutions (1848) 
  1864 66.97*** 
(8.37) 
 Limited government (1867)/ 
Austro-Prussian War (1866) 
  1888 26.39*** 
(5.79) 
Nationalization of railways (1880s) 
      
France  1854 38.90*** 
(5.71) 
 Year of Revolutions (1848)/ 
Coup by Napoleon III (1851) 
  1869 39.52*** 
(6.06) 
 Limited government (1870)/ 
Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) 
  1879 29.65*** 
(3.12) 
 Conquest of Tunisia (1881)/ 
Mandingo Wars (1882–1898) 
      
Netherlands  1829 4.91 
(1.53) 
 Belgian Revolt (1830)/ 
Belgian War of Independence (1830–1833) 
  1839 4.49** 
(2.31) 
 Constitutional reforms (1840) 
  1873 19.22*** 
(9.01) 
 Atjeh War in Sumatra (1873–1914) 
      
Prussia  1847 49.12*** 
(6.33) 
 Limited government (1848)/ 
Year of Revolutions (1848) 
  1893 –8.17** 
(2.45) 
 Resignation of Bismarck (1890) 
  1903 11.56** 
(2.21) 
 Herero Uprising in southwest Africa 
(1904–1908)
      
Spain  1838 51.24*** 
(5.53) 
 Fiscal centralization (1844)/ 
First Carlist War (1833–1839) 
  1855 47.20*** 
(3.98) 
 Rebellion of 1854 
  1872 25.63** 
(2.20) 
 Limited government (1876)/ 
Third Carlist War (1872–1876) 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: The first column lists the relevant Group 1 sample countries. The second column 
displays the years for the best three structural breaks from 1815–1913 for each polity as deter-
mined by the algorithm described in the text. The third column reports the percentage change in 
average per capita revenues over the ten years following the break in question as compared to 
the ten years that preceded it. T-statistics in absolute values are in parentheses. The final column 
offers brief “explanations” for the turning points, which are elaborated upon in the text. 
Sources: See the text. 
in 1831. Centralization took place the same year as Prussia’s disastrous 
loss to the French at Jena-Auerstedt. That defeat, which prompted sig-
nificant administrative reforms, led to a 145 percent increase in per  
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capita revenues. It appears that the 1831 turning point was the result  
of the first Zollverein customs agreement between German polities. The 
break, which was associated with a 7 percent decrease in revenues,  
suggests that the elimination of tariffs harmed Prussian finances. 
 Curiously, limited government—which occurred during the Year of 
Revolutions in 1848—was not included as one of the best turning points 
in Prussia from 1650 to 1913. Figure 5, however, shows a substantial 
increase in per capita revenues from that point onwards. Richard Tilly 
also argues that constitutional changes sparked by the 1848 Revolution 
strengthened the government’s ability to raise revenues and invest in 
public infrastructure.70 Thus, it was not surprising that the structural 
breaks tests for the nineteenth century selected 1847 as the best turning 
point in the Prussian series. According to Table 8, limited government 
boosted revenues by nearly 50 percent.
 For the reasons discussed above, the structural analysis for Austria-
Hungary and the Netherlands was restricted to the nineteenth century. 
As Table 8 indicates, the best breaks in Austria-Hungary came with fis-
cal centralization and the Year of Revolutions (1849), limited govern-
ment and the Austro-Prussian War (1864), and the nationalization of 
railways that began in the 1880s. Each political transformation led to 
large revenue increases (45 and 67 percent, respectively). In the Nether-
lands, we observe turning points with the Belgian Revolt and subse-
quent War of Independence at the start of the 1830s, the constitutional 
amendments of 1840, and the start of the Atjeh War in Sumatra in 1873. 
Interestingly, the break most closely identified with limited government 
was the abdication of King Willem I and related constitutional reforms 
at the start of the 1840s, and not the Revolution of 1848. This turning 
point highlights the importance of the first set of liberal changes, which 
led to a significant increase in per capita revenues.
CONCLUSION 
 This article analyzes the relationship between political regimes and 
public revenues in European countries from 1650 to 1913. Panel regres-
sions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated  
with significant increases in per capita revenues relative to fragmented 
and absolutist ones. Structural breaks tests that assume no a priori 
knowledge of possible turning points in the revenue series support these 
conclusions.
70 “Political Economy” and “Public Finance.”  
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 The results lend new credence to arguments that espouse the virtues 
of limited government. Yet they also suggest that, while a credible 
commitment to sound fiscal policies is necessary to improve public  
finances, it is not sufficient. Nascent states in Europe were weak and 
fragmentation created many headaches. Fiscal centralization—so my 
analysis suggests—was just as essential as limited government to  
develop efficient systems of taxation. Indeed, an intriguing topic for  
future work would be a quantitative study of the effects of tax variations 
and free riding within Old Regime polities.  
Appendix 1: Political Regimes 
 Fiscal centralization was completed the year that the national government began to 
secure revenues by way of a tax system with uniform rates throughout the country. 
Limited government emerged the year in which parliament gained the stable 
constitutional right to control the national budget on an annual basis. For stability, 
parliament’s power of the purse had to hold for at least two consecutive decades. For 
additional details, see the text.  
Austria-Hungary
 Though Napoleon defeated Austria-Hungary in 1805, he was unable to replace Old 
Regime fiscal structures there. In 1848 a liberal revolution failed. This event, however, 
was the catalyst for the creation of uniform administrative structures within the 
Austrian Empire. Most significantly, the central government began to implement an 
effective Cisleithanian-style tax system in Hungary. I thus date fiscal centralization 
to 1848. The “Compromise” of 1867, which established Austria and Hungary as dis-
tinct political entities, marked the start of a constitutional era. From that point on, both 
territories had parliaments that exercised regular control over state finances.71
Belgium 
 The First French Republic invaded and annexed Belgium in 1795. Thereafter, fiscal 
centralization proceeded under Napoleon as for the rest of France. In 1830 Belgium—
then part of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands, established at the Napoleonic 
era’s end—declared independence from Dutch rule. Founded as a constitutional 
monarchy, Belgium became an independent country in 1831.72
Denmark
 A cadastre system, established for land taxation in 1688, remained in force until the 
introduction of a modern land tax in 1903. With few exceptions, rates were uniform 
outside of chartered towns. I thereby date fiscal centralization to 1688 as the best fit 
71 Pammer, “Public Finances.” Also see Breuilly, Austria; Beller, Concise History; Macart-
ney, House; and Sked, Decline.
72 Holtman, Napoleonic Revolution, p. 100; Sutherland, France, pp. 344–46; and Cook, Bel-
gium, pp. 49–50. 
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with my definition.73 In 1848 King Frederick VII declared himself a constitutional 
monarch. A liberal constitution took effect the following year. However, the 1848 re-
gime endured for less than two decades. Absolutism was restored in 1866. The revised 
constitution, which allowed the crown to appoint one-fourth of parliament’s members, 
remained in force until 1915.74
England (Britain) 
 By the end of the twelfth century, England had strong national institutions.75 I date 
fiscal centralization to the Norman Conquest (1066), which undercut provincial au-
thority and contributed to the establishment of uniform rule. The Glorious Revolution 
(1688) established parliament’s power of the purse. For references, see the section, 
“Introduction.”  
France
 For details, see the text. 
Italy
 “Italy” was a geographical rather than political expression through the nineteenth 
century.76 Italian polities were typically fragmented. In Piedmont, for instance, the 
monarch ruled separately over the duchies of Savoy, Aosta, Saluzzo, Monferrat, the 
principalities of Oneglia and Piedmont, the county of Nice, and later the Kingdom of 
Sardinia.77 Napoleon carried out administrative reforms including fiscal centralization 
at the start of the 1800s. Bids to enact liberal constitutions in 1848 in Naples and the 
Papal States failed. King Carlo Alberto of Piedmont, however, was able to establish a 
constitutional monarchy, which later formed the political basis for the Kingdom of 
Italy, founded in 1861. The unification of public finances also occurred during this 
period.78
The Netherlands 
 For details, see the text. 
73 Hans Christian Johansen provided this account. Also see Jespersen, History.
74 Jones, Denmark, pp. 36–37 and 60; and Jesperson, History.
75 Acts of Union assimilated England with Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707, and with 
Ireland in 1800. In 1921 Ireland was partitioned into two states, the Irish Free State and North-
ern Ireland, which remains part of the United Kingdom. Brown, Society, pp. 13–16; and Daun-
ton, Progress, pp. 271–73. For additional details, see Appendix 2.  
76 During the eighteenth century, the peninsula was divided into the following autonomous 
polities: the Duchies of Massa and Carrara, Modena, Parma, and Tuscany, the Kingdoms of 
Lombardy, Naples, Piedmont, Sardinia, and Sicily, the Papal States, and the Republics of Ge-
noa, Lucca, and Venice. See Hearder, Italy, p. 309; Carpanetto and Ricuperati, Age of Reason,
p. 337; and Toniolo, Economic History, p. 49.  
77 Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration, pp. 63–66.  
78 Godechot, Hyslop, and Dowd, Napoleonic Era, p. 181; Hearder, Italy, pp. 51–52, 60–61, 
101–02, 113–14, 130–34, 147–48, 232–36, and 244–46; and Toniolo, Economic History, pp. 
45–56.
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Portugal
 Though Napoleon invaded Portugal in 1807, he was unable to implement major 
economic and political reforms. Comprehensive changes including fiscal centraliza-
tion did not occur until 1832. In 1820 a liberal revolution failed. The Revolutionary 
era, which lasted for 31 years, ended with the establishment of a stable constitutional 
monarchy in 1851.79 For a list of nineteenth-century Portuguese revolutions, coups, 
and civil wars, see Appendix 4. 
Prussia
 After French defeat in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806, the Prussian govern-
ment made quick economic and political reforms including fiscal centralization.80
King Freidrich Wilhelm IV endorsed a liberal constitution during the Year of Revolu-
tions (1848). According to R. Tilly, Prussian executives faced binding constraints 
from that point onwards.81 Nonetheless, the fledgling constitutional regime had its 
shortcomings. In the 1860s, for example, the government operated without legislative 
approval of the military budget.82
Spain
 At the start of the 1700s, Bourbon reformers strengthened the power of the crown in 
Castile and imposed new taxes on Spain’s eastern provinces. Tax rates varied across 
regions, however, depending upon the particular bargain made. I thus take the Bour-
bon reforms as an example of tax particularism rather than fiscal centralization. For 
additional details, see the text. Though Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, the French 
were unable to generate modern laws and administrative practices. Fiscal centraliza-
tion did not occur until 1844 amidst a “moderate” decade of institutional reforms. 
From 1808 to 1876, civil strife created political chaos. After decades of failed initia-
tives, a stable constitutional monarchy was established in 1876, which lasted until a 
coup in 1923.83 For a list of nineteenth-century Spanish revolutions, coups, and civil 
wars, see Appendix 4.  
Sweden
 An anachronistic tax system remained in Sweden through the mid-1800s. I date fis-
cal centralization to the far-ranging “departmental” reforms of 1840 that strengthened 
the central government.84 The Constitution of 1809, intended to limit the executive’s 
power, failed to bring fundamental change. The king retained absolute veto authority 
and parliament met only once each five years. Sweden remained conservative through 
79 Birmingham, Concise History, pp. 104–05 and 125; Feijo, Liberal Revolution, pp. 6, 10–
11, 14–16, and 23; and Mata and Valerio, Història Econòmica, pp. 142–43.  
80 Contemporaries considered the Prussian tax system one of the most efficient in Europe, 
even prior to fiscal centralization. See Kiser and Schneider, “Bureaucracy.”  
81 ”Political Economy” and “Public Finance.”  
82 Tilly, “Political Economy,” pp. 486–93; Godechot, Hyslop, and Dowd, Napoleonic Era;
Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration; and Breuilly, “Napoleonic Germany,” pp. 131–32. 
83 Carr, Spain; Vicens Vive, Economic History; Lynch, Bourbon Spain; Tortella, Develop-
ment, pp. 27–32 and 173–92; and Tortella and Comìn, “Merits,” pp. 155–65.  
84 Scott, Sweden, p. 396; Magnusson, Economic History, pp. 57, 73, and 188; and Schon, 
“Rise.”  
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the 1860s. I date limited government to 1866, when Prime Minister De Greer led a 
successful effort to dissolve the Diet of Estates and introduce a bicameral legislature.85
Appendix 2: Sources for Revenue Data 
 Revenue figures concern income from taxation collected by national governments. 
Loan income was subtracted whenever possible. I use abbreviations to denote 
different series for revenue (REV1, REV2…) and population (POP1, POP2…). Other 
abbreviations are Mitchell’s British Historical Statistics (BHS) and International His-
torical Statistics (IHS). The complete data set is available at the Global Price and 
Income History Group’s website at http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/. For additional details, see 
the text. 
Austria-Hungary
 REV1 is central government revenue in Austria, 1781–1913, from Mitchell, IHS.
The series covers Austria-Hungary through 1847 and from 1850–1867 and Cisleitha-
nia only (i.e., the Austrian portion) for 1848/49 and from 1868 onwards. Lombardy is 
included through 1858 and Venetia through 1865. Total yields are for fiscal receipts 
only to 1864 and ordinary receipts from 1865–1875. From 1876 onwards, they include 
certain extraordinary receipts. From 1875–1890, the Mitchell data include cash saldi
and loan proceeds. Hence, for those years I used corrected figures (i.e., without saldi
or loan proceeds) as provided by Michael Pammer. REV2 is central government reve-
nue in Transleithania (i.e., the Hungarian portion), 1868–1913, from Mitchell, IHS.
The series of Austro-Hungarian central government revenues consists of REV1: 1781–
1867; and REV1 + REV2: 1868–1913.  
 POP1 is population of Austria for 1818, 1821, 1824, 1827, 1830, 1834, 1837, 1840, 
1843, 1846, 1851, 1857, 1869, 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910, from Mitchell, IHS. Fig-
ures are for the civil population of Cisleithania only. POP2 is population of Lombardy 
for 1832–1840, 1842–1844, and 1846–1854, provided by Pammer. POP3 is population 
of Venetia for 1832–1840, 1842–1844, and 1846–1854, also provided by Pammer. For 
POP2 and POP3, years 1841, 1845, and 1849/50 were interpolated. The data for 1832 
were used for years 1818–1831 and the data for 1854 were used for years 1855–1858 
(Lombardy) and 1855–1865 (Venetia) due to data limitations. POP4 is population of 
Hungary for 1787, 1793, 1804, 1817, 1843, 1846, 1850, 1857, 1869, 1880, 1890, 
1900, and 1910, from Mitchell, IHS. Figures are for Transleithania. The Austro-
Hungarian population series consists of POP1 + POP2 + POP3 + POP4: 1818–1847, 
1850–1858; POP1 + POP2 + POP3: 1848/49; POP1 + POP3 + POP4: 1859–1865; and 
POP1 + POP4: 1866–1910. All intermediate years were interpolated.
 The gulden became the general monetary unit in Austria-Hungary after the War of 
Austrian Succession and was set at the Convention of 1753 with one gulden equal to 
60 kreuzer. Austria-Hungary decimalized in 1857, adopting a system of one gulden
to 100 kreuzer.86 I converted Austro-Hungarian revenues into grams of gold as fol-
lows. First, revenues in gulden were converted into revenues in kreuzer by multiplying 
by 60. Second, revenues in kreuzer were transformed into revenues in silver by 
85 Oakley, Story, p. 203; Scott, Sweden, pp. 379 and 388; Magnusson, Economic History, pp. 
67–70; Nordstrom, History, pp. 66–67; and Schon, “Rise.”  
86 Since one pre-1858 gulden was equal to 1.05 gulden from 1858 onwards, I multiplied the 
pre-1858 gulden series by 1.05. 
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multiplying by the yearly exchange rate provided by Giovanni Federico and Pammer. 
Third, revenues in silver were transformed into revenues in gold by dividing by the 
silver for gold price ratio according to Lawrence Officer, “Price.” Lastly, I divided by 
the Austro-Hungarian population to find per capita revenues in grams of gold. The 
kreuzer-silver exchange rate series ended in 1878 and the kroner-pound one began. I 
converted Austro-Hungarian revenues into grams of gold from 1879 onwards as fol-
lows. First, revenues in kronen were transformed into revenues in pounds by multiply-
ing by the yearly exchange rate. Second, revenues in pounds were transformed into 
revenues in grams of gold by dividing by the market price of gold in ounces. Third, 
revenues in ounces of gold were transformed into revenues in grams of gold by mul-
tiplying by 28.35. Lastly, I divided by the Austro-Hungarian population to find per 
capita revenues in grams of gold. 
Belgium
 REV1 is central government revenue, 1831–1912, from Mitchell, IHS. Data are un-
available for 1913. The series of Belgian central government revenues consists of 
REV1: 1831–1912. 
 POP1 is population of Belgium from Mitchell, IHS. The Belgian population 
series consists of POP1: 1816, 1831, 1846, 1856, 1866, 1880, 1890, and 1910. All 
intermediate years were interpolated.  
 Belgium adopted the French monetary system during French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic times with one Belgian franc equal to one French franc.87 Hence, I used 
the Paris market price of gold in francs per gram provided by Rosenthal. 
Denmark
 REV1 is central government revenue, 1853–1913, from Mitchell, IHS. Revenue 
figures include the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg from 1853–1864. 
Population figures include the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg from 
1853–1864. The series of Danish central government revenues consists of REV1: 
1873–1913.  
 POP1 is the population of Denmark from Mitchell, IHS. The Danish population 
series consists of POP1: 1769, 1787, 1801, 1834, 1840, 1845, 1850, 1855, 1860, 
1870, 1880, 1890, 1901, 1906, and 1911. Population figures include the Duchies of 
Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg from 1853–1864. All intermediate years were
interpolated.  
 I converted Danish revenues into grams of gold as follows. Denmark joined the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union in 1872 and adopted the gold standard in 1873 at one 
pound sterling equal to 18.1595 kroner. I first transformed kroner into pounds by di-
viding by 18.1595. I then transformed Danish revenues in pounds into Danish reve-
nues in gold by dividing by the London market price of gold in pounds per fine ounce 
taken from Officer, “Price.” Danish revenues in ounces of gold were transformed into 
revenues in grams of gold by multiplying by 28.35. Lastly, I divided by the Danish 
population to find per capita revenues in grams of gold. 
87 Morys, “Emergence,” pp. 38–44. 
86 Dincecco
England (Britain)
 REV1 is total revenue to the English Crown, 1650–1824, from O’Brien, “Total 
Revenue.” REV2 is net receipts of the public income for Great Britain, 1692–1801, 
from Mitchell, BHS. REV3 is central government revenue for Great Britain, 1750–
1801, and for the United Kingdom, 1802–1913, from Mitchell, IHS. The series of Brit-
ish central government revenues consists of REV1: 1650–1691; REV2: 1692–1749; 
and REV3: 1750–1913. Years 1654 and 1660 were interpolated. 
 POP1 is population of England, from Mitchell, BHS. These figures do not include 
Wales.88 POP2 is population of Wales for 1701, 1751, 1781, 1801, and 1831, from 
Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth. POP3 is population of Scot-
land. The 1650 figure is from Jan De Vries, European Urbanization; the 1701 figure 
from Richard Brown, Society, p. 33; and the 1755 figure from Mitchell, BHS. All in-
termediate years for Wales and Scotland were interpolated. POP4 is the estimated 
mid-year home population of the British Isles, from Mitchell, BHS. The British popu-
lation series consists of POP1: 1650–1691; POP1 + POP2 + POP3: 1692–1801; and 
POP4: 1802–1913.89
 The British official price of gold in pounds per fine ounce, 1650–1717, and the 
London market price of gold in pounds per fine ounce, 1718–1913, is from Officer, 
“Price.” With the exception of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic times, both se-
ries are nearly identical. British revenues in ounces of gold were transformed into 
revenues in grams of gold by multiplying by 28.35.  
France
 REV1 is ordinary revenues of the French monarchy, 1650–1695, from Bonney, 
“Categories.” REV2 is total royal revenue in France from various sources converted 
into livres tournois, 1660–1775, from Bonney, “Total Royal Revenue.” REV3 is 
French ordinary revenue, 1727–1814, from Bonney, “French Ordinary Revenue.” 
REV4 is French revenue, 1650–1870, provided by Velde. REV5 is ordinary central 
government revenue, 1815–1913, from Mitchell, IHS. REV6 is extraordinary central 
government revenue, 1815–1890, from the Annuaire Statistique. The series of French 
central government revenues consists of REV1: 1650–1656 and 1662; REV2: 1661–
1703, 1705–1715, 1727–1750, 1757/58, 1761, 1763, and 1773/74; REV3: 1751–1754, 
1764/65, 1768, 1780/81, 1788–1796, and 1806–1813; REV4: 1716–1726, 1759/60, 
1766/67, 1769, 1772, 1775–1779, 1782–1787, 1791–1805, and 1814; REV5 + REV6: 
88 Wrigley and Schofield, Population History, p. 10. 
89 One must distinguish between institutional innovations in England itself and for Britain as 
a whole. To control for such differences, I used the population for the relevant political entities 
when calculating per capita figures. As discussed in Appendix 1, Acts of Union assimilated 
England with Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707, and with Ireland in 1800. From 1650–
1691, revenue data for the English Crown were used since British data were unavailable. To 
convert them into per capita terms, I divided by the English population only. Due to data un-
availability, neither Wales nor Scotland was included, though at the time the English Crown col-
lected revenues from those domains. By making the pre-1692 population denominator smaller 
than it actually was, both decisions bias against the hypotheses that limited government resulted 
in an increase in revenues. Revenue data are for Great Britain (i.e., England, Scotland, and 
Wales) from 1692–1801 and for the United Kingdom (i.e., Great Britain and Ireland) from 
1802–1913. Accordingly, population figures were used for England, Scotland, and Wales from 
1692–1801, and England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland from 1802–1913.  
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1815–1890; and REV5: 1891–1913. Years 1657–1660, 1755/56, 1762, and 1770/71 
were interpolated.90
 POP1 is population of France from Jacques Dupaquier, Histoire, vol. 2. POP2 is pop-
ulation of France from Mathias and O’Brien, “Taxation.” POP3 is population of France 
from Yves Blayo and Louis Henry, “Population.” POP4 is population of France at cen-
suses from Mitchell, IHS. The French population series consists of POP1: 1650, 1670, 
1680, 1690, and 1710; POP2: 1715, 1725, 1730, and 1735; POP3: 1740, 1745, 1750, 
1755, 1760, 1765, 1770, 1775/76, 1780/81, 1785/86, 1790/91, 1795/96, 1800/01, 
1805/06, 1810/11, 1815/16, 1820/21, 1825/26, 1830/31, 1835/36, 1840/41, 1845/46, 
1850/51, 1855/56, and 1860/61; and POP4: 1866, 1872, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 
1901, 1906, and 1911. All intermediate years were interpolated. 
 Rosenthal provided the Paris market price of gold in francs per gram, 1650–1913. 
Italy
 REV1 is central government revenue, 1862–1883, and 1886–1913, from Mitchell, 
IHS. The series of Italian central government revenues consists of REV1: 1862–1913. 
Years 1884/85 were interpolated. 
 POP1 is population of Italy from Mitchell, IHS. The Italian population series 
consists of POP1: 1861, 1871, 1881, 1901, and 1911. All intermediate years were 
interpolated.  
 The lira was adopted as the monetary unit of Italy in 1862, with one lira equal to 
one French franc.91 Hence, I used the Paris market price of gold in francs per gram 
provided by Rosenthal. 
The Netherlands
 REV1 is total tax revenues in the Dutch Republic, 1572–1795, from Fritschy et al., 
“Provincial Finances.” Fritschy assisted with this remarkable data set. The computa-
tion method was as follows. First, provincial tax streams for Drenthe, Friesland, Gro-
ningen, Holland, Overijssel, and Utrecht were tallied. The sums included income from 
direct and indirect taxes, but excluded that from land sales and loans. Totals for Bra-
bant and Gelderland were calculated according to Fritschy. Official quotas for Over-
ijssel and Gelderland were 3.60 percent and 5.61 percent, respectively. Totals for Gel-
derland were computed as (5.61/3.60) = 1.56 times the totals for Overijssel. Those 
totals were also used for Brabant. Data for Zeeland as well as its Admiralty come from 
Wietse Veenstra, Geld and Gewestelijke. His admirality figures included customs 
(convooien en licenten) as well as tonnage (lastgeld) and ship (veilgeld) taxes. Data on 
customs taxes for the four other Admiralties (i.e., Amsterdam, Friesland, Noorderk-
wartier, and Rotterdam) were taken from Johannes Hovy, Het voorstel.92 Admiralty 
figures also included annual payments of 364,000 guilders made by the Dutch East 
India Company. Total tax revenues for the republic as a whole were computed as sums 
of the previous categories. For additional details, see the text. REV2 is income of the 
Batavian Republic and its successors, 1803–1810 and 1814, from Van Zanden and 
Van Riel, Strictures. REV3 is income during the reign of Willem I, 1814, 1821, 1826, 
90 Massive inflation, which occurred in France from 1794–1796, resulted in per capita reve-
nue calculations that were abnormally large. I thus interpolated the revenue figures for those 
years based on the 1793 and 1797 tallies.  
91 Global Financial Database, “Italy (GHOC).” 
92 Wietse Veenstra provided these data. 
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1831, 1836, and 1840, from Van Zanden and Van Riel, Strictures. Their totals for 
years 1815–1830 include Belgium. To account for its contribution, I subtracted aver-
age net Belgian transfers per year.93 The resulting figures matched up well with inter-
polated figures as found in Fritschy and René Van Der Voort, “Fragmentation.” REV4 
is central government revenue, 1845–1913, from Mitchell, IHS. The series of Dutch 
central government revenues consists of REV1: 1720–1795; REV2: 1803–1810; 
REV3: 1814–1840; and REV4: 1845–1913. Years 1841–1844 were interpolated.  
POP1 is population of the Netherlands from De Vries, European Urbanization. Van 
Zanden provided the population data used in the per capita revenue series for Holland 
that appears in Figure 2. POP2 is population of the Netherlands from Mitchell, IHS. The 
Dutch population series from 1650–1913 consists of POP1: 1650, 1700, 1750, and 1800; 
POP2: 1816, 1829, 1839, 1849, 1859, 1869, 1879, 1889, 1899, and 1909. All interme-
diate years were interpolated. Consistent with the revenue figures, population numbers 
exclude the Southern Netherlands. 
 W. L. Korthals Altes provided the Dutch market price of gold in guilders per gram, 
1719–1913. Years 1749 and 1759, which were missing, were interpolated. 
Portugal
 REV1 is effective central government revenue, 1852–1913, from Maria Mata, Fi-
nanças pùblicas. Figures do not include revenues from loans.94 The series of Portu-
guese central government revenues consists of REV1: 1852–1913. 
 POP1 is population of Portugal from Mitchell, IHS.95 The Portuguese population se-
ries consists of POP1: 1841, 1854, 1858, 1861, 1864, 1878, 1890, 1900, and 1911. All 
intermediate years were interpolated.  
 I converted Portuguese revenues into grams of gold from 1852–1913 in the follow-
ing way. First, revenues in contos were transformed into mil-reis by multiplying by 
1000. Second, revenues in mil-reis were transformed into revenues in pounds by di-
viding by the exchange rate. Yearly averages of monthly exchange rates were used. 
Third, revenues in pounds were transformed into revenues in grams of gold by divid-
ing by the market price of gold in ounces. Fourth, revenues in ounces of gold were 
transformed into revenues in grams of gold by multiplying by 28.35. Lastly, I divided 
by the Portuguese population to find per capita revenues in grams of gold. 
Prussia
 REV1 is net revenues, 1688–1806, from Martin Korner, “Total Revenue.” For 
1688–1713, revenue figures came from the military treasury only. REV2 is total 
ordinary revenues, 1807–1913, from Hans Mauersberg, Finanzstrukturen.96 The series 
of Prussian central government revenues consists of REV1: 1688–1806; REV2: 1821, 
1829, 1841, 1847, 1850, 1855, 1860, 1867, 1868, 1870, 1874, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 
1900, 1905, and 1910. All intermediate years were interpolated. 
93 As described in Van Zanden and Van Riel, Strictures, p. 99. For instance, the net transfer 
from Belgium from 1814–1820 was 11,800,000 guilders, or 1,966,666 guilders per year over 
the six-year period. Hence, I subtracted this amount (1,966,666 guilders) from total income for 
each year from 1814–1820. I did the same for 1821–1825 and 1826–1830. 
94 Rui Esteves provided these data. Figures are for fiscal years 1851–1852, 1852–1853, and 
so on. Hence, I took an average of the two surrounding fiscal years to compute annual revenues. 
95 The Azores and Maderia were included from 1841 onwards.  
96 Mark Spoerer provided these data. 
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POP1 is population of Prussia provided by Peter Brecke. Note that these figures in-
corporate Prussian territorial changes over the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries 
as best as possible. POP2 is population of Prussia from Mauersberg, Finanzstrukturen.
The Prussian population series consists of POP1: 1688–1865; POP2: 1870, 1874, 
1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905, and 1910. All intermediate years were 
interpolated.  
 I converted Prussian revenues into grams of gold as follows. Thaler units were first 
transformed into silver ones by multiplying by 16.667.97 I then transformed revenues 
from silver units to gold ones by dividing by the silver for gold price ratio found in Of-
ficer, “Price.” Lastly, I divided by the Prussian population to find per capita revenues 
in grams of gold. Note that revenues were given in marks from 1857–1913, where one 
mark was worth one-third of a thaler following Xavier de Vanssay, “Monetary Un-
ions.” Hence, for this period I transformed mark units into thaler ones by dividing by 
three before proceeding through the steps just described.  
Spain
 REV1 is ordinary and extraordinary revenues, 1703 and 1713, from John Lynch, 
Bourbon Spain. REV2 is ordinary and extraordinary revenue categories to the Spanish 
Crown, 1753–1788, from Juan Gelabert, “Revenue.” REV3 is Ingresos Totales del Es-
tado, 1801–1842, from Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell, Estadìsticas. REV4 is 
Derechos Reconocidos y Liquidados Totales, 1845–1913, from Carreras and Tafunell, 
Estadìsticas. The series of Spanish central government revenues consists of REV1: 
1703 and 1713; REV2: 1753–1788; REV3: 1801–1807, 1813–1820, 1822, 1824–
1839, and 1841/42; and REV4: 1845 and 1849–1913. Years 1714–1752, 1789–1800, 
1808–1812, 1821, 1823, 1843/44, and 1846–1848 were interpolated. 
 POP1 is population of Spain from De Vries, European Urbanization. POP2 is 
population of Spain from Carlos Nogal and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “decaden-
za.” POP3 is population of Spain from Lynch, Bourbon Spain. POP4 is population 
of Spain from Mitchell, IHS. The Spanish population series consists of POP1: 
1650, 1700, and 1850; POP2: 1750 and 1787; POP3: 1717 and 1797; and POP4: 1768, 
1857, 1860, 1877, 1887, 1897, 1900, 1910, and 1920. All intermediate years were 
interpolated.  
 The Spanish market price of gold or silver was not available over the sixteenth to 
nineteenth centuries because buying and selling bullion outside the Spanish mint was 
forbidden.98 Hence, I converted Spanish revenues into grams of gold as follows. First, 
the pounds for pesos exchange rate was transformed into pounds for pesetas by mul-
tiplying by five.99 Second, revenues in pesetas were transformed into revenues in 
pounds by dividing by the exchange rate. Yearly averages of monthly exchange rates 
were used. Third, revenues in pounds were transformed into revenues in grams of gold 
by dividing by the market price of gold in ounces. Fourth, revenues in ounces of gold 
were transformed into revenues in grams of gold by multiplying by 28.35. Lastly, I 
divided by the Spanish population to find per capita revenues in grams of gold.  
97 Giovanni Federico alerted me to this conversion.  
98 Maria Del Pilar Nogués Marco alerted me to this fact.  
99 I employed the London Pound for Madrid Peso (1698–1913) data set from the Global Fi-
nancial Database to do so. Yearly averages of monthly exchange rates were used. Since the 
Spanish revenue data were in pesetas, I made the following conversion: 1 peso equal to 20 
reales and 1 peseta equal to 4 reales, meaning that 1 peso equaled 5 pesetas. See Vicens Vive, 
Economic History, pp. 582–83 and 713–15; and Tortella, Development, p. 158, for details. 
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Sweden
 REV1 is central government revenue, 1881–1913, from Mitchell, IHS. The series of 
Swedish central government revenues consists of REV1: 1881–1913.  
 POP1 is the population of Sweden from Mitchell, IHS. The Swedish population se-
ries consists of POP1: 1750, 1760, 1770, 1775, 1780, 1785, 1790, 1795, 1800, 1805, 
1810, 1815, 1820, 1825, 1830, 1835, 1840, 1845, 1850, 1855, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 
1900, and 1910. All intermediate years were interpolated. 
 I converted Swedish revenues into grams of gold from 1881–1913 in the following 
way. As for Denmark, Sweden adopted the gold standard in 1873 as part of the Scan-
dinavian Monetary Union at one pound sterling equal to 18.1595 kronor. I first trans-
formed kronor into pounds by dividing by 18.1595. I then transformed Swedish reve-
nues in pounds into Swedish revenues in gold by dividing by the London market price 
of gold in pounds per fine ounce taken from Officer, “Price.” Lastly, I divided by the 
Swedish population to find per capita revenues in grams of gold. 
Appendix 3: Warfare 
 Wars and war years are from Clodfelter, Warfare. I included all conflicts fought at 
least in part in Western Europe (as well as those fought at least in part in Eastern 
Europe so long as they involved at least one sample country) from 1650 to 1913. 
Appendix Table 1 provides a complete list.  
 Clodfelter’s dates for war durations were used though in some cases formal peace 
treaties were not signed until years after ceasefires were implemented. In military 
usage, “casualty” refers to all persons lost to active military service, including those 
killed in action or by disease, disabled by physical or mental injuries, captured, de-
serted, or missing. Data limitations mean that Clodfelter’s figures often refer to sol-
diers killed or wounded in battle as well as deaths by disease rather than to casualties 
per se. Further back in time, such reports became more common. In those cases, I em-
ployed total military deaths. When Clodfelter did not provide such tolls, I summed 
deaths from major land and sea battles as well as major sieges to compute death totals. 
In all cases, death totals were divided by conflict length to determine average military 
deaths per year of warfare (in thousands).100 Average deaths per conflict were summed 
for each year that a sample state was involved in two or more wars.  
 I calculated coalition population totals as the sums of the available populations (in 
millions) of member countries in the years that conflicts began. As for military deaths, 
(i.e., nonoverlapping) opposition coalition totals were added for each year that a sam-
ple state was involved in two or more conflicts. Population figures were unavailable 
for sample countries as follows: Austria-Hungary prior to 1818, Denmark prior to 
1769, and Sweden prior to 1750. Population figures for Bosnia, Poland, Russia, and 
Turkey were taken from Orjan Martinsson, Historical Atlas. I also used his population 
data to compute coalition population sums that included Portugal from 1650–1767. 
Martinsson, however, does not offer relevant seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
population figures for Austria-Hungary, Denmark, or Sweden. For additional details 
about the population data, see Appendix 2.
100 Though Clodfelter assembled his casualty figures with great care, the historical nature of 
the data suggests that they should be interpreted as estimates rather than absolutes. See Warfare,
p. xvi. 
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Appendix 4: Regression Variables 
 For additional details, see the text. For warfare, see Appendix 3. The dependent va-
riable is the natural logarithm of per capita revenues for each sample country for each 
available year from 1650–1913. 
 The dummy variable for fragmented and absolutist political regimes takes a value of 
one for each year that a sample country possessed a fragmented and absolutist regime 
from 1650–1913. As the benchmark case, I omitted it from the regression specifica-
tions and results. The dummy variable for centralized and absolutist political regimes 
takes a value of one for each year that a sample country possessed a centralized and 
absolutist regime from 1650–1913. The dummy variable for the fragmented and 
limited political regime takes a value of one for each year that a sample country pos-
sessed a fragmented and limited regime from 1650–1913.101 The dummy variable 
for centralized and limited political regimes takes a value of one for each year that a 
sample country possessed a centralized and limited regime from 1650–1913. 
 The country dummy variable takes a value of one to identify individual sample 
countries. The dummy variable for civil wars, coups, and revolutions takes a value of 
one for the year(s) during any civil war, coup, and revolution within sample countries 
from 1650–1913, according to Clodfelter, Warfare; Robin Winks and Thomas Kaiser, 
Europe; or the Encyclopedia Britannica. Appendix Table 2 provides a complete list. 
Insurrections, massacres, riots, and uprisings were generally not included.  
 The urbanization variable calculates the urban population as a fraction of the total 
population for each sample country annually. All urban population figures are from De 
Vries, European Urbanization. Figures for 1650, 1700, 1750, and 1800 are from ap-
pendix 3, pp. 305–337, and figures for 1850, 1890, and 1980 are from table 4.8, pp. 
44–47, for cities with populations of at least 10,000 inhabitants through 1850, with at 
least 20,000 inhabitants in 1890, and with at least 100,000 inhabitants in 1980.102 All 
intermediate years were interpolated. For country population sources, see Appendix 2. 
 The per capita GDP variable, taken from Angus Maddison, World Economy, meas-
ures per capita GDP in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars for sample countries 
from 1650–1913. Data are available for 1600, 1700, and 1820–1913. All intermediate 
years were interpolated.103 The world gold stock variable, taken from Velde and We-
ber, “Bimetallism,” measures per year differences in the cumulative world stock of 
gold in millions of troy ounces from 1650–1913.104
101 There is only one such case among sample countries. For additional details, see the sec-
tion, “Political Regimes in Europe.” 
102 De Vries provides urbanization figures for Germany rather than for Prussia and for Scan-
dinavia rather than for Denmark or Sweden. Urbanization figures for Austria include Bohemia.  
103 A lack of data led me to substitute German per capita GDP figures for Prussia.  
104 François Velde provided these data.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
EUROPEAN MILITARY CONFLICTS, 1650–1913
Conflict  Year(s) 
Country, Coalition, 
and Population Deaths/Year Details 
Franco-Spanish War  1648–1659  Fr (18.50) v. Sp (7.10) 0.73  TMD 
First Anglo-Dutch 
War 
 1652–1654  En (5.24) v. Fr, Nl 
(20.59) 
1.73  K or W in 
MSB 
First Northern War  1655–1660  Ah, Dk, Pl, Ru (na) v. 
Se (na) 
na   
Anglo-Spanish War  1655–1659  En (5.25) v. Sp (7.14) na   
Portuguese-Spanish 
War 
 1661–1668  Pt (2.15) v. Sp (7.19) na   
Habsburg-Ottoman
War 
 1663–1664  Ah (na) v. Tr (19.20) 8.50  TMD 
Second Anglo-Dutch 
War 
 1665–1667  En (5.11) v. Dk, Fr, Nl 
(21.64) 
4.88  K or W in 
MSB 
War of Devolution  1667–1668  En, Nl, Sp, Se (14.24) 
v. Fr (19.90) 
2.00  TMD 
Third Anglo-Dutch 
War 
 1672–1674  En, Fr (25.30) v. Nl 
(1.90) 
2.26  K or W in 
MSB 
Franco-Dutch War  1672–1679  En, Fr, Se (25.30) v. 
Dk, Nl, Sp (9.18) 
4.49  K and/or W in 
MLB, MSB 
Habsburg-Ottoman
War 
 1683–1689  Ah, Pl (na) v. Tr 
(20.20) 
12.53  K and W 
(MSB); TMD 
(MLB, MS) 
French Conquest of 
Luxembourg
 1684  Fr, Nl (23.24) v. Sp 
(7.37) 
2.00  TMD 
War of Grand  
Alliance 
 1688–1697  Ah, En, Nl, Pt, Sp 
(16.44) v. Fr (21.50) 
8.14  K and/or W in 
MLB, MSB 
Great Northern War  1700–1721  Dk, Pr, Pl, Ru (29.30) 
v. Se (na) 
31.82  TMD 
War of Spanish  
Succession 
 1701–1714  Ah, En, Nl, Pt, Pr 
(12.16) v. Fr, Sp 
(27.30) 
16.19  K and/or W in 
MLB, MSB, 
MS 
Venetian-Austrian-
Turkish War 
 1714–1718  Ah (na) v. Tr (21.70) 28.00  K or W 
War of Quadruple 
Alliance 
 1718–1720  Ah, En, Fr, Nl (28.38) 
v. Sp (8.12) 
15.00  K or W 
Spanish War  1727–1729  En, Fr (27.90) v. Sp 
(8.12) 
0.27  K in MLB 
War of Polish  
Succession 
 1733–1735  Ah, Ru (15.80) v. Fr, 
Pr, Sp (31.90) 
31.33  K or W; Pl not 
included for 
either side due 
to civil war 
Austro-Russian-
Turkish War 
 1735–1739  Ah, Ru (16.10) v. Tr 
(22.80) 
24.00  K or W or 
TMD by 
country 
War of Austrian  
Succession 
 1740–1748  Ah, En, Nl, Ru (26.01) 
v. Fr, Pr, Sp (50.3) 
28.89  K and/or W or 
TMD by 
country 
Russo-Swedish War  1741–1743  Ru (17.10) v. Se (na) 1.90  K or W 
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Conflict Year(s)
Country, Coalition, 
and Population Deaths/Year Details
Seven Years’ War  1756–1763  Ah, Fr, Ru, Sp, Se 
(55.60) v. En, Pt, Pr 
(13.90) 
85.75  TMD; avg. of 
Clodfelter’s
three estimates  
Corsican War  1768–1769  Co (na) v. Fr (26.40) 5.00  TMD 
War of Bavarian  
Succession 
 1778–1789  Ah (na) v. Pr (6.12) 1.62  DD, K, M, TP, 
W
Russo-Swedish  
War 
 1788–1790  Ru (24.80) v. Se 
(2.17) 
3.26  K or W 
War of First  
Coalition 
 1792–1797  Ah, En, Nl, Pt, Pr, Sp 
(23.99) v. Fr (27.70) 
32.45  CD 
War of Second  
Coalition 
 1798–1801  Ah, En, Pr, Ru, Tr 
(78.20) v. Fr, Nl 
(34.80) 
38.63  CD 
Napoleonic Wars  1803–1815     TMD 
War of Third  
Coalition 
 1805–1807  Ah, En, Pr, Ru, Se 
(66.80) vs. Fr, Nl, Pl 
(44.10) 
233.33   
Peninsular War  1807–1814  En, Pt, Sp (25.00) vs. 
Fr, Nl (31.90) 
300.00   
Austrian War  1809  Ah (na) vs. Fr, Nl 
(32.10) 
300.00  Pl not included 
as its troops 
fought on both 
sides 
Russian
Campaign
 1812  Ah, Dk, Ru (43.40) vs. 
Fr, Nl, Pl (35.40) 
150.00  
Average 
deaths/year, 
1812–1814
Leipzig
Campaign
 1813  En, Pr, Ru, Se (69.40) 
vs. Fr, Nl (32.50) 
Campaign in 
France
 1814  En, Nl, Ru, Pr, Se 
(74.20) vs. Fr (30.30) 
Austrian
Campaign
 1815  Ah (na) vs. Fr (30.30) 60.00  
TMD, 1815 Waterloo
Campaign
 1815  Ah, En, Nl, Pt, Pr, Sp 
(45.40) vs. Fr (30.30) 
Russo-Swedish  
War 
 1808–1809  Ru (39.70) v. Se 
(2.41) 
3.07  K or W 
Riego Rebellion  1823  Fr (32.00) v. Sp 
(13.20) 
6.50  TC 
Belgian War of  
Independence 
 1830–1833  Be, En, Fr (61.20) v. 
Nl (2.64) 
0.72  CD including 
1830 Rebellion 
Austro-Sardo War  1848–1849  Ah (36.51) v. Sd (na) 9.98  CD 
First Italian War of 
Independence 
 1848–1849  Ah, Fr, Sp (87.56) v. It 
(23.60) 
5.47  K or W 
First Schleswig- 
Holstein War 
1848–1849 Dk, Se (4.80) v. Pr 
(16.30) 
3.00 TMD 
Crimean War 1853–1856 En, Fr, Tr (89.30) v. 
Ru (70.20) 
153.84 TMD 
Franco-Austrian War 1859 Ah (35.44) v. Fr 
(37.20) 
19.60 CD 
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Conflict Year(s)
Country, Coalition, 
and Population Deaths/Year Details
Second Italian War  
of Independence 
1859–1861 Ah (35.44) v. It 
(24.90) 
1.01 K or W 
Second Schleswig- 
Holstein War 
1864 Ah, Pr (55.76) v. Dk 
(2.54) 
4.21 CD, M, PD 
Austro-Prussian War 1866 Ah (34.90) v. It, Pr 
(47.50) 
16.36 CD or DW 
Battle of Mentana 1867 Fr (37.70) v. It (26.10) 1.28 K or W 
Franco-Prussian War 1870–1871 Fr (36.80) v. Pr 
(24.60) 
91.83 TMD 
Austrian Conquest of 
Bosnia
1878 Ah (37.49) v. Bo 
(1.16) 
3.48 DD, K, M 
Notes: Enemy coalition populations are in millions. Average military deaths per conflict year 
are in thousands. Country abbreviations are Austria-Hungary (Ah), Belgium (Be), Bosnia (Bo), 
Corsica (Co), Denmark (Dk), England (En), France (Fr), Italy (It), the Netherlands (Nl), Poland 
(Pl), Portugal (Pt), Prussia (Pr), Russia (Ru), Sardinia (Sa), Spain (Sp), Sweden (Sw), and Tur-
key (Tr). Other abbreviations are Combat Deaths (CD), Dead of Disease (DD), Died of Wounds 
(DW), Killed (K), Major Land Battles (MLB), Major Sea Battles (MSB), Major Sieges (MS), 
Missing (M), Presumed Dead (PD), Taken Prisoner (TP), Total Casualties (TC), Total Military 
Deaths from all causes (TMD), and Wounded (W). Coastal and naval campaigns not included in 
the calculations for the Napoleonic Wars since average deaths per year were less than 1,500.  
Source: See Appendix 3. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
EUROPEAN CIVIL WARS, COUPS, AND REVOLUTIONS, 1650–1913
Country  Year(s)  Event 
Austria-Hungary   1848  Year of Revolutions 
     
Belgium  1789–1790  Brabant Revolution  
  1830  Belgian Revolution  
Denmark  1848  Year of Revolutions 
     
England  1649–1651  Third English Civil War  
  1688  Glorious Revolution  
France  1789–1799  French Revolution  
  1799  Coup by Napoleon I  
  1815  Bourbon Restoration  
  1830  July Revolution  
  1848  Year of Revolutions 
  1851  Coup by Napoleon III  
  1870  Fall of Second Empire  
  1871  Paris Comune  
Italy    No civil war, coup, or revolution from
1861–1913
     
Netherlands  1785  Batavian Revolution  
  1814–1815  Establishment of Dutch Kingdom  
  1830  Belgian Revolution  
  1848  Year of Revolutions 
Portugal  1808  Revolution of 1808 
  1820  Revolution of 1820 
  1820–1823  First Civil War of Portuguese Revolution  
  1823  Coup of 1823 
  1827–1828  Miguelite Insurrection  
  1832–1834  Second Civil War of Portuguese Revolution  
  1836  Coup of 1836 
  1846–1847  Third Civil War of Portuguese Revolution 
  1849  Costa Cabral Coup  
  1851  Saldanha Coup  
  1910  Establishment of First Portuguese Republic  
Prussia  1848  Year of Revolutions 
     
Spain  1820  Coup of 1820 
  1823  Restoration of 1823 
  1833–1839  First Carlist War  
  1843  Moderate Coup  
  1847–1849  Matiners’ (Second Carlist) War  
  1854  Rebellion of 1854 
  1863  Government collapse of 1863  
  1868–1870  Glorious Revolution  
  1872–1876  Third Carlist War  
(encompasses 1874 Restoration)  
  1909  La Semana Tràgica  
Sweden  1772  Coup of 1772  
  1792  Assassination of Gustav III  
  1809  Coup against Gustav IV  
Source: See Appendix 4. 
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